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Resumen en Castellano
Mi tesis se centra en el análisis de los efectos de imperfecciones del mercado de
crédito causada por información asimétrica y por regulaciones sobre contratos -
nancieros óptimos, especialmente para las pequeñas empresas (empresas emprende-
doras). En particular, se proponen modelos que pueden reproducir varios hechos
estilizados en los mercados de crédito. Estos modelos proporcionan implicaciones
adicionales comprobables.
El primer capítulo Why are Small Firms more likely to use Convertible debt?
presenta un modelo de agente-principal bajo no vericabilidad de los rendimientos
de las empresas. La no vericabilidad de los rendimientos de las empresas puede
llevar las empresas a un defecto estratégica ex post. Las empresas con activos
iniciales ilíquidos y heterogéneos necesitan fondos para invertir en un proyecto cuya
rentabilidad depende del fondo invertido y del esfuerzo de las empresas, que no es
observable para los nancieros. Se demuestra que los contratos de deuda convertibles
pueden mitigar la ineciencia ex post. Por otra parte, se generaliza el modelo en dos
direcciones: el riesgo moral y la aversión al riesgo de las empresas. En ambos casos,
se demuestra el comportamiento óptimo de los contratos de deuda convertibles para
las pequeñas empresas.
En el segundo capítulo "Non-monotonic E¤ect of Bankruptcy Exemptions on
Small FirmsFinance", se propone un simple modelo de agente-principal. En mu-
chos trabajos empíricos, se examina el vínculo entre el marco jurídico y las nanzas
de las empresas. Las empresas (los agentes) no conocen la calidad de los proyectos
que han elegido, sin embargo, los bancos pueden obtener la calidad de los proyectos
de las empresas mediante la monitorización costosa. La precisión de tal monitor-
ización depende de la intensidad de monitorización empleada por los bancos. Nue-
stro modelo demuestra que, en equilibrio, el préstamo obtenido por las empresas,
así como la tasa de interés bruta, se determinan a través de dos canales: (1) Efecto
directo: un efecto de las exenciones de bancarrota directamente sobre los contratos
de equilibrio de la deuda, y (2) Efecto indirecto: un efecto de la exención de la
bancarrota indirectamente sobre los contractos de equilibrio de deuda a través de la
intensidad de monitorización de los bancos. Por la combinación de ambos efectos,
el modelo produce una relación no monótona entre exenciones de bancarrota y el
tamaño del préstamo de equilibrio de las empresas, así como la tasa de interés de
equilibrio bruto, como se muestra también en los datos.
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En el tercer capítulo "Borrowing Decisions in the Presence of Credit Market
Imperfections and Heterogeneous Risk", se muestra que las decisiones de nan-
ciamiento de los empresarios no sólo dependen de las restricciones de crédito, sino
también de la demanda de seguro de consumo de los empresarios. La literatura an-
terior destaca el impacto de las imperfecciones del mercado de crédito en la decisión
de endeudamiento de los empresarios. En mi modelo, las actitudes heterogéneas de
los empresarios al riesgo interactúan con dos fuentes distintas de las imperfecciones
del mercado de crédito - responsabilidad limitada y riesgo moral - y estas imper-
fecciones resultan en distintas decisiones de nanciamiento. En particular, cuando
los empresarios se ven limitados por una restricción de responsabilidad limitada, su
endeudamiento y por lo tanto, el capital invertido aumenta con su riqueza inicial.
Por otro lado, en la presencia de riesgo moral, los empresarios se ven limitados por
una restricción de compatibilidad de incentivos, y piden prestado menos y por lo
tanto, eligen un menor capital a medida que aumenta su riqueza inicial.
2
Dissertation Abstract
My thesis focuses on analyzing the e¤ects of credit market imperfections caused
by asymmetric information or regulations on optimal nancial contracts, especially
for small rms (entrepreneurial rms). In particular, I propose models that can
replicate several stylized facts in credit markets. These models provide further
testable implications.
Chapter 1 Why are Small Firms more likely to use Convertible Debts?presents
a principal-agent model under non-veriability of rm returns. Non-veriability of
rm returns may lead to rmsex-post strategic default. Firms with heterogeneous
initial illiquid assets need fund to invest in a project whose return depends on the
fund invested and rmse¤ort, which is unobservable to the nanciers. We show that
convertible debt contracts can mitigate ex-post ine¢ ciency. Moreover, we further
generalize the model into two directions: moral hazard and risk aversion of the rms.
In both cases, we prove the optimality of convertible debt contracts for small rms.
In Chapter 2 Non-monotonic E¤ect of Bankruptcy Exemptions on Small Firms
Finance, a simple principal-agent model is presented. The link between law and
rmsnance are examined in many empirical works. Firms (agents) do not know
the quality of the projects they have chosen, however, banks can learn the quality
of the rmsprojects by costly screening. The accuracy of screening depends on
banks screening intensity exerted. Our model demonstrate that, in equilibrium,
the loan obtained by the rms, as well as the gross interest rate, are determined
through two channels: (1) Direct E¤ect: an e¤ect of bankruptcy exemptions directly
on the equilibrium debt contracts, and (2) Indirect E¤ect: an e¤ect of bankruptcy
exemption indirectly on the equilibrium debt contracts via banksscreening inten-
sity. Combining both e¤ects, our model yields a non-monotonic relation between
bankruptcy exemptions and the equilibrium loan size of the rms as well as the
equilibrium gross interest rate as shown in the data.
In Chapter 3 Borrowing Decisions in the Presence of Credit Market Imper-
fections and Heterogeneous Risk, I show that entrepreneursborrowing decisions
depend not only on the borrowing constraints, but also on the entrepreneursde-
mand for consumption insurance. Previous literature highlights the impact of credit
market imperfections on the entrepreneursborrowing decision. In my model, entre-
preneursheterogeneous risk attitudes interact with two di¤erent sources of credit
market imperfections-limited liability and moral hazard-and these imperfections re-
sult in distinct borrowing decisions. Specically, when entrepreneurs are restricted
by a limited liability constraint, their borrowing and hence the invested capital
increases with their initial wealth. On the other hand, in the presence of moral
3
hazard, entrepreneurs are constrained by an incentive compatibility constraint, and
they borrow less and hence choose lower capital as their initial wealth increases.
4
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Chapter 1
Why Are Small Firms More Likely
to Use Convertible Debt?
Non-veriability of rm returns may lead to rmsex-post strategical default. Under
non-veriability of rm returns, a principal-agent model is presented in this paper.
Firms with heterogeneous initial assets need funds to invest in a project whose
return depends on the fund invested and rmse¤ort, which is unobservable to the
nanciers. We show that convertible debt contracts can mitigate ex-post ine¢ ciency.
Moreover, we further generalize the model into two directions: moral hazard and
risk aversion of the rms. In both cases, we prove the optimality of convertible debt
contracts for small rms.
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1.1 Introduction
Consider a rm that needs to raise funds in order to invest in a project. In the
literature of rmschoices of nancing sources, it is well known that the conicts
between the rms1 and their nanciers may cause economic ine¢ ciency. In the rms
with debt nancing, rms might choose to invest in too risky projects, or they might
hide the cash ows and default on their debt even they are able to pay back. If the
rms are risk neutral, debt nancing can e¤ectively prevent the owner-managers to
shirk (Innes (1990)). On the other hand, if rms choose equity nancing, they might
exert too little e¤ort (Dybvig and Wang (2002)). However, the rms do not have
incentive to hide their cash ows. Therefore, whether a rm should choose debt or
equity nancing depends on which of the two incentive problems is relatively more
severe.
We start with an environment in which rms exert observable e¤ort and they
are protected by the limited liability when they default. Firms ex-post returns
are observable to both rms owner-managers and their nancial claimants, but
are not veriable by a third party (i.e., court). It is possible that non-veriable
rm returns, which results in rmsstrategic defaults, distort the investorse¢ cient
lending decisions. We consider rms are heterogeneous in their initial assets. The
rmsbenets of defaulting strategically varies with their initial assets. Firms with
smaller initial assets are more likely to default strategically than those with larger
initial assets. The reason is that small rms have little to lose if they default and
le for bankruptcy. If this problem is serious, compared with debt nancing, equity
nancing may be preferable. Afterwards, we relax the assumption of observable
e¤ort and consider unobservable e¤ort. Under this setting, another agency problem
arises with equity nancing, the incentives of rmsowner-managers to exert e¢ cient
e¤ort are distorted under equity nancing.
Our goal is to derive the optimal contracts such that in equilibrium, rms exert
e¢ cient e¤ort and there are no strategic defaults. In this paper, we show that con-
vertible debt contracts are optimal. Such a contract gives the holders an unilateral
right to convert the debt into equity at the predetermined time and price (conver-
sion rate). Convertible debt has the properties that combine both debt and equity.
Specically, it can thought as a standard debt contract plus a call option to convert
the debt into equity when the rms return has greater upside potential. We use this
feature of convertible debt and our result shows that the problem of rmsstrategic
defaults due to non-veriable rm returns can be solved.
The available evidence about convertible debt shows that small rms (i.e., rms
1For simplicity, we assume rms owners are also managers of the rms. Hence, we can ignore the
conict between the owners and the managers of the rms.
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with smaller initial assets) and rms with higher prot-to-assets ratio are more likely
to use convertible debt over standard debt than larger rms. Noddings, Christoph
and Noddings (2001) analyze the trading of U.S. convertible debts and convertible
preferred stocks in January 2000. They nd that among the total of 311 compa-
nies that use convertible debts, 58% are micro or small rms. Kahan and Yermack
(1998) show empirically that the issuance of convertible debts is negative signi-
cantly related to the rm size2. Lewis, Rogalski and Seward (1999) nd that rms
with higher prot-to-assets ratio are more likely to use convertible debt.
Our paper is related to the literature on optimal contracts when the credit market
is imperfect. In particular, Innes (1990) shows that, under limited liability and
moral hazard due to the rms unobservable e¤ort, standard debt contracts are
optimal. Since rms are residual claimers under standard debt contracts, standard
debt contracts give rms incentives to exert e¤ort. However, Innes (1990) considers
the environment with veriable rmscash ows. We instead, relax the assumption
of veriable rm returns and characterize the optimal contracts assuming that the
rm returns are not veriable.
Besides, this paper is also closely related to the literature of incomplete con-
tracts pioneered by Hart (Hart (2001), Hart and Moore (2007)). Due to the non-
veriability of rm returns, contracts can not be contingent on the rmsreturns.
As Hart mentioned, incompleteness of contracts open the door to a theory of owner-
ship. In a recent work by Fluck (2010), he mentions that when the rmsreturns or
the owner-managersmisbehavior can not be veried or are too costly to be veried
by the court, there are at least two ways to accomplish the optimal contracts. One
is to make the contract contingent on other veriable terms. The other way is to
grant the investors an unconditional control right. This right allows the investors to
threat the rms owner-manager to replace him/her or to liquidate the rms assets
even though the rms return is in the upside. However, this threat only works if
the project is long-term. In the last period of the project, the owner-manager can
never be induced to make the repayment without defaulting. Moreover, this threat
only is e¤ective if the rm has substantial assets. For the rms with little assets,
this threat is not e¤ective since small rms have little to lose. Consequently, the
nanciers are not willing to lend to small rms even though small rms have projects
with positive present values. This leads to an ex-ante ine¢ ciency. Hence, in order
to discourage rmsstrategic default ex-post, ex-ante ine¢ ciency must be sacriced
at least partially.
Another related strand of literature focuses on the optimal security design of
2 In their paper, rm sizes are dened by measuring rmstotal initial assets. In particular, micro-cap:
smaller than 225 million, small-cap: between 225 million and 1.25 billion, medium-cap: bewteen 1.25
billion and 10.5 billion, large-cap: larger than 10.5 billion.
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venture capital nancing. It studies the agency problem caused by double moral
hazard between the rms and the venture capitalists. Repullo and Suarez (RS,
2004) and Schmidt (2003) show that under a double moral hazard problem, the
optimal contracts are convertible debt contracts. In RSs papers, rst, convertible
debt contracts solve the agency problem because convertible debt contracts allow the
venture capitalists to share the rmsprot and hence provide the venture capitalists
incentives to exert e¤ort. Second, by using stage nancing (which is commonly
used in venture capital nancing), the venture capitalists can threat the rm to
stop providing them credits in order to induce the rms to exert e¤ort. Schmidt
(2003) shows that convertible debt contracts can induce both venture capital rms
and venture capitalists to exert e¤ort sequentially. In his model, both rms of all
di¤erent size and the venture capitalists will only exert e¤ort under convertible debt
contracts.
In this paper, the impact of non-veriable rm returns are crucial on determining
the optimal contracts. We rst construct a simple model to show that standard
debt contracts are dominated by both equity and convertible contracts for small
rms because small rms have incentives to default strategically if rmsreturns
are not veriable. Furthermore, we generalize the model in two directions. First,
we consider a moral hazard problem due to rms unobservable e¤ort. Second,
instead of assuming risk-neutrality of both rms and their nanciers, we consider
risk aversion the rms.
In the former case (with moral hazard probelm), we derive the optimality of
convertible debt contracts for small rms. This result is consistent with the em-
pirical evidence (Noddings, Christoph and Noddings (2001) & Lewis, Rogalski and
Seward (1999)). Moreover, under this setting, we show that the probability of using
convertible debt is positively related with the rmsprot-to-asset ratio, which is
also found in the data (Lewis, Rogalski and Seward (1999)).
In the latter (with risk-averse rms), our results suggest that, under certain
conditions, in partucular, if the rms utility function has a complete monotone
rst derivative and if the probability of failure of the project under equity contracts
is lower than 1
2
, convertible debt contracts are optimal for small rms if rms are
risk-averse. The reason is that small rms have incentives to default strategically
under standard debt contracts. Hence, standard debt contracts are dominated.
Moreover, under the condition of the probability of failure of the projects being
low, convertible debt contracts dominates equity contracts because convertible debt
achieves better risk sharing. As for large rms, since they do not have incentives to
default strategically, both standard debt and convertible debt contracts are optimal.
We also discuss the case when both directions of generalizations exist at the
same time. We conclude that the relation between moral hazard and the relative
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degree of risk aversion of the rms and the nanciers importantly shape the optimal
contracts. In particular, we conjecture that the result of the optimality of convertible
debt contracts for small rms still holds even when considering the moral hazard
problem and the risk aversion of the rms.
The outline of this paper is the following: In Section 2, we rst analyze the bench-
mark model. Afterwards, we relax the assumption of veriability of rm returns and
characterize the optimal contracts. In Section 3 and Section 4, we generalize the
model in two directions moral hazard and risk aversion  and analyze the op-
timal contracts under each case. We further discuss the more general case when
considering both directions together in Section 5. Finally, we conclude in Section 6.
1.2 The Model
In this paper, a principal-agent model is presented. Firms (agents) have an in-
vestment project of positive present value, but they do not have funds to nance
the project. As a result, rms have to obtain the funds from the nanciers, the
principals. The assumptions of the model are:
Assumption 1 Firms and nanciers are both risk neutral. The rms are het-
erogenous in terms of their initial assets3 A, A 2  0; A, where A is su¢ ciently high.
The nanciersopportunity cost of lending per unit is assumed to be exogenous,
and for simplicity, i = 1.
Assumption 2 The investment project yields a random return
y =
(

0
if the project succeeds
if the project fails
The distribution of the realized returns is endogenous, depending on the funds B
invested in the project and rmse¤ort e which is observable to the nanciers. For
simplicity, we assume that there are two levels of e¤ort, e 2 feH ; eLg. The cost is
increasing in the e¤ort with c (eL) = 0 and c (eH) = cH > 0.
The probability of success of the project is denoted as p (B; e), with p0B (B; e) > 0
and p00B (B; e) < 0 for any e, and p (B; eH) > p (B; eL) for any B.
Assumption 3 The project returns of rms are observable to both parties
(rms and their nanciers), however, returns are not veriable by a third party
(e.g., court).
3We assume the rmsinitial assets can be liquidated without any liquidation cost. Firms can liquidate
(partially) their own assets and self nance. Under the assumption of no liquidation cost, the rmsare
indi¤erent between self-nancing or external nancing.
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Assumption 4 Firmsliability to debt, as well as the nanciersliability to the
investment are limited. That is, if a rm obtains debt from the nancier, once it
defaults and les for bankruptcy, the nancier (lender) liquidates the rms assets
up to the required repayment. Besides, the repayment to the nanciers whether the
project succeeds or not is non-negative.
Assumption 5 Financiers compete a la Bertrand.
Assumption 3 is crucial in this paper. In the following analysis, we rst analyze
the benchmark model in which Assumption 3 is ignored. In other word, in the
benchmark model, we consider an environment in which rm returns are veriable.
Next, we analyze the e¤ect of non-veriability on the optimal contracts. Further,
we generalize the model by relaxing Assumption 2 and Assumption 1, respectively.
In particular, in the rst generalized model, we consider that rmse¤ort is unob-
servable to the nanciers. In the second generalized model, we consider risk averse
rms and risk neutral nanciers:
1.2.1 The benchmark case
In this section, we derive the optimal contract as a benchmark in the environment
that both, rmse¤ort and project returns, are observable and veriable. After-
wards, we focus on three types of contracts which are commonly used in reality: (1)
standard debt contract, (2) equity contract and (3) convertible debt contract.
The optimal contract outcomes are the solution to the following problem:
max
B;e;s1;s2
p (B; e) (   s1 + A) + (1  p (B; e)) ( s2 + A)  c (e)
s.t.
El = p (B; e) s1 + (1  p (B; e)) s2  B  0 (PC)
   s1 + A  0 (LL1)
 s2 + A  0 (LL2)
where (s1; s2) is the repayment from the rm to the lender if the project succeeds
or fails, respectively.
Lemma 1 El = 0
Lemma 1 shows that, in equilibrium, the nanciers participation constraint al-
ways binds due to Bertrand competition. The equilibrium borrowing amount B (ej)
depends on e¤ort e and it satises
p0B (B
 (ej) ; ej) =
1

; j = H;L
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We further assume that it is optimal to exert high e¤ort for all rms.
Assumption 6 Exerting eH is optimal.
Assumption 6 implies that, in equilibrium, a rms expected prot if exerting eH
is strictly higher than the expected prot if exerting eL for any A:
p (B (eH) ; eH)   B (eH) + A  cH > p (B (eL) ; eL)   B (eL) + A
Equivalently,
 >
(B (eH) B (eL)) + cH
p (B (eH) ; eH)  p (B (eL) ; eL)
Proposition 2 The optimal contract (B; s1; s2jA) is a state-contingent contract. In
equilibrium,
(1) B = B (eH) = B, where p0B (B
; eH) = 1
(2) Repayment schemes

s1; s

2js1   + A; s2  A; s1 = B
 (1 p(B;eH))s2
p(B;eH)

are not
unique,
Proposition 2 shows that the optimal borrowing amount B increases as  in-
creases.
Due to the risk-neutrality of the rms and the nanciers, the optimal repayment
scheme is indeterminate. According to Modigliani and Millers (1958) theorem on
the irrelevance of rmsnancial structure, any equilibrium repayment scheme that
satises Proposition 2, is optimal. Therefore, standard debt, equity and convertible
debt contracts are all optimal in the benchmark case. Note that in this paper, we
assume that the costs of signing di¤erent types of contracts are the same. Without
loss of generality4, we assume that the cost is equal to zero. If the costs were
di¤erent, the contract with the lowest cost would be optimal.
Assumption 7 The cost of signing standard debt, equity and convertible debt
contracts equals to zero.
In the following sections, we analyze these three types of contracts which are
commonly used in reality standard debt, equity and convertible debt contracts
and show that if the rm returns and e¤ort are observable and veriable, all three
types of contracts are optimal.
Standard debt contract
A standard debt contracts (B; rjA) species the rms borrowing amount B and
the corresponding interest rate r for a rm with initial asset A. In equilibrium, the
4As long as the costs of signing di¤erent types of contracts are equal, there is no di¤erence between
assuming cost = 0 or cost = c (>0), where c is constant.
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contract (B; rjA) satises the nanciers participation constraint (PC),
p (B; e)Br + (1  p (B; e))min (Br;A) B  0 (PC)
the rmslimited liability constraints (LL1&LL2),
  Br + A  0 (LL1)
 min (Br;A) + A  0 (LL2)
and the rms expected prot is maximized.
Proposition 3 The equilibrium standard debt contract (B; rjA) is optimal for all
risk-neutral rms, where in equilibrium
(1) B = B
(2) r = 1 for A  B; and r = B (1 p(B;eH))A
p(B;eH)B
> 1 for A < B
For unconstrained rms (rms with initial assets A  B), in equilibrium, both
limited liability constraints do not bind. Besides, they have enough initial assets to
repay fully even if the project fails. Their nanciers always obtain the full repayment,
thus, their debt is secured, and the equilibrium interest rate for the unconstrained
rms is equal to 1.
For constrained rms (rms with initial assets A < B), one limited liability
constraint LL2 binds in equilibrium. This means that if the project fails, the rms
go bankrupt, and their assets are liquidated by the nanciers. The nanciers cannot
receive the full repayment once the project fails, thus, the equilibrium interest rate
is higher than 1 in order to satisfy the nanciersparticipation constraint. Besides,
the equilibrium interest rate for constrained rms decreases when the rms initial
asset increases.
Given that the rm returns are observable and veriable by a third party, under
standard debt contracts, rms do not default strategically (i.e., they do not default
when the project succeeds). If the project succeeds, once the rms default, their
assets will be liquidated and the nanciers will still obtain full repayment as if the
rms do not default because the rm returns will be veried and thus they have to
repay fully.
Equity contract
An equity contract (B; sjA) species the investment amount B that the nancier
invests and the share s (0 < s < 1) of the rm(s value) that the nancier obtains
(at the end of the period). Specically, the prot the nancier obtains is s if the
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project succeeds, and sA if the project fails. In equilibrium, the contract (B; sjA)
for a given A satises the nanciersparticipation constraint (PC),
p (B; e) s + (1  p (B; e)) sA B  0 (PC)
the rmslimited liability constraints (LL1&LL2)
   s + A  0 (LL1)
sA+ A  0 (LL2)
and the rmsexpected prots are maximized.
Proposition 4 The equilibrium equity contract (B; sjA) given an initial asset A is
optimal, where in equilibrium
(1) B = B
(2) s = B

p(B;eH)+(1 p(B;eH))A
Since the nancier obtains his share of the rms prot automatically, the -
nanciers expected prot is the same whether the rm returns are veriable or not.
Convertible debt contract
Denition 5 Convertible debt contracts
A convertible debt contract is a standard debt contract plus a call option which
gives the nancier a unilateral right to convert the debt to equity at a predetermined
time and with a predetermined conversion rate.
A convertible debt contract (B; r; jA) for a rm with initial asset A species
the borrowing amount B and interest rate r and a predetermined conversion rate
 (0 <  < 1). Specically, the nancier receives y if the nancier converts debt
to equity. The equilibrium convertible debt contract maximizes the rms expected
prot subject to the nanciers participation constraint (PC)
p (B; e)max (Br; ) + (1  p (B; e))max (min (A;Br) ; A) B  0 (PC)
and the two limited liability constraints of the rm (LL1&LL2)
  max (Br; ) + A  0 (LL1)
 max (min (A;Br) ; A) + A  0 (LL2)
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In equilibrium, if the project succeeds, rms have no incentive to default strate-
gically because if they do so, the nanciers can either simply convert the debt to
equity and thus share the prot, or even if they do not convert, they can go to
the court and verify the rmsreturn. Hence, the nanciers can obtain the same
repayment whether they convert or not, and the rms will not default strategically.
If the project fails, in equilibrium, the constrained rms always default, and the
nanciers will not convert because A < A. As for the unconstrained rms, they
have no incentives to default, and the nanciers obtain the full repayment.
Proposition 6 The equilibrium convertible debt contract (B; r; jA) given an initial
assets A is optimal, where
(1) B = B for all rms
(2) r = 1 for A  B; and r = B (1 p(B;eH))A
p(B;eH)B
for A < B
(3)  = B


for A  B; and  = B (1 p(B;eH))A
p(B;eH)
for A < B
In the previous section, under veriability of rm returns and risk-neutrality of
both rms and their nanciers, all three types of contracts: standard debt, equity
and convertible debt contracts are optimal. Since under veriability for all three
types of contracts, rms have no incentives to default strategically. Besides, under
risk-neutrality of both rms and their nanciers, rms are indi¤erent among all
three contracts since in equilibrium rmsexpected prots are the same and are
maximized under all three types of contracts.
Through the following sections in this paper, we assume that rm returns are
observable to both the rms themselves and their nanciers, but not veriable by a
third party (Assumption 3), which is crucial to our analysis.
1.2.2 Non-veriable rm returns
Now, suppose that rmsproject returns are not veriable by a third party (As-
sumption 3). For unconstrained rms (A  B), all three types of contracts are
optimal. The reason is that under standard debt contracts, unconstrained rms do
not have incentives to default strategically. Unconstrained rms have enough assets
such that even if they default, the nanciers still obtain the full repayment B.
Moreover, since convertible debt and equity contracts are both immune to ex-post
strategic default, they are optimal under non-veriability of rm returns.
For constrained rms, standard debt contracts are not optimal. The reason is
that constrained rms have incentives to default strategically under standard debt
contracts. Because of non-veriability of rm returns and limited liability of the
rms, if the project succeeds, a constrained rms prot is  if it defaults and its
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prot is    B A
p(B;eH)
if it does not default. The rms prot is higher if it defaults.
|{z}
default
>    B
   A
p (B; eH)| {z }
not default
As a result, equilibrium standard debt contracts must mitigate the rmsincentives
to default strategically. That is, if the project succeeds, the equilibrium repayment
must not exceed the rmsinitial assets A. Therefore, the equilibrium borrowing
amount B equals the rmsinitial assets and standard debt contracts are not optimal
for constrained rms.
Equity contracts and convertible debt contracts are both immune to ex-post
strategic default due to non-veriability of rm returns. An equity holder shares
the rms return automatically. Convertible debt contracts grant the nanciers a
unilateral right to convert debt to equity and thus to share rms return if the
project succeeds.
Proposition 7 Under non-veriability of rm returns,
(1) For unconstrained rms, standard debt, equity and convertible debt are all
optimal
(2) For constrained rms, standard debt contracts are dominated. Equity and
convertible debt contracts are optimal
So far, we have shown that under non-veriability of rm returns, standard
debt contracts are dominated by the other two types of contracts. However, it is
not enough to show the optimality of convertible debt contracts for smaller rms.
Nor is it enough to explain the fact that the probability of using convertible debt
contracts is positively related to the rmsprot-to-assets ratios. In the following
two sections, we only consider the environment with non-veriable rm returns
(under Assumption 3) through the whole following paper. Besides, we further relax
Assumption 2 and then Assumption 1 each by each.
1.3 Generalized Model (1): Moral hazard
In this section, we generalize the model and relax the assumption of observable rm
e¤ort (Assumption 2). The moral hazard problem is generated by the dependence
of the distribution of the project returns on the rmse¤ort choice, which is unob-
servable to the nanciers. In order to provide incentives to the rms to exert high
e¤ort, it is necessary to let the rms bear some risk of the project. In the following
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analysis, we again focus on the three types of contracts and derive the equilibrium
contracts under moral hazard.
1.3.1 Standard debt contract
The equilibrium standard debt contracts for unconstrained rms are the solution to
the following problem:
max
B;e;r
p (B; e) (  Br + A) + (1  p (B; e)) ( Br + A)  c (e)
s.t.
El = p (B; e)Br + (1  p (B; e))Br  B  0 (PC)
  Br + A  0 (LL1)
 Br + A  0 (LL2)
(p (B; eH)  p (B; eL))   cH (IC)
Proposition 8 For A  B, the equilibrium standard debt contract (B; rjA) is
optimal,
(1) B = B
(2) r = 1
The equilibrium standard debt contracts for unconstrained rms are exactly the
same as the ones in Proposition 3. The unconstrained rms pay a xed repayment
B and keep the rest of the returns. Therefore, they have incentives to exert high
e¤ort, and the (IC) constraints do not bind.
As for constrained rms, as we mentioned before, the standard debt contracts
in Proposition 3 will not be o¤ered in equilibrium since the constrained rms have
incentive to default strategically due to non-veriability of rm returns. As a re-
sult, in equilibrium, standard debt contracts are clearly dominated by equity and
convertible debt contracts.
1.3.2 Equity contract
If equity contracts are o¤ered in equilibrium, the equilibrium equity contracts must
solve the following problem:
max
B;e;s
p (B; e) (   s + A) + (1  p (B; e)) ( sA+ A)  c (e)
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s.t.
p (B; e) s + (1  p (B; e)) sA B  0 (PC)
   s + A  0 (LL1)
sA+ A  0 (LL2)
(p (B; eH)  p (B; eL)) (   s (   A))  cH (IC)
Proposition 9 For A  A2, the equilibrium equity contracts (B; sjA) is optimal,
(1) B = B
(2) s = B

p(B;eH)+(1 p(B;eH))A
where
A2 =


B  

cH
p(B;eH) p(B;eL)

p (B; eH)

B +

cH
p(B;eH) p(B;eL)

(1  p (B; eH))
For A  A2, the equilibrium equity contracts are the same as the ones stated
in Proposition 4. This shows that for the rms with higher A (A  A2), equity
contracts are optimal. However, for the rms with smaller A (A < A2), there will
be no equity contracts o¤ered in equilibrium due to the (IC) constraints.
1.3.3 Convertible debt contract
The equilibrium convertible debt contracts are the solution to the following problem:
max
B;e;
p (B; e) (  max (Br; ) + A)+(1  p (B; e)) (0 max (min (A;Br) ; A)) c (e)
s.t.
p (B; e)max (Br; ) + (1  p (B; e))max (min (A;Br) ; A) B  0 (PC)
  max (Br; ) + A  0 (LL1)
 max (min (A;Br) ; A) + A  0 (LL2)
(p (B; eH)  p (B; eL)) [(  max (Br; ) + A) + max (min (A;Br) ; A)]  cH
Proposition 10 For A  A1, the equilibrium convertible debt contract (B; r; jA)
is optimal,
(1) B = B for all rms
(2) r = 1 for A  B; and r = B (1 p(B;eH))A
p(B;eH)B
for A1  A < B
(3)  = B


for A  B; and  = B (1 p(B;eH))A
p(B;eH)
for A1  A < B
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where
A1 = B
   p (B; eH)

   cH
p (B; eH)  p (B; eL)

Proposition 10 demonstrates that convertible debt contracts are optimal for any
A  A1 if rmse¤ort is unobservable.
We show that, for unconstrained rms, all three types of contracts are still opti-
mal even if taking into account the moral hazard problem since the (IC) constraints
do not bind for larger rms. For constrained rms, standard debt contracts are not
optimal because the rmshave incentives to default strategically. Equity contracts
and convertible debt contracts both solve this ex-post strategical default. However,
here due to the moral hazard problem, equity contracts are not optimal for rms
with initial assets A smaller than a threshold A2. For a rm with small initial asset
A < A2, in order to induce it to exert high e¤ort, the share s assigned to the nancier
can not be too high. However, if the share is not high enough, the nanciers partic-
ipation constraint (PC) is violated (i.e., nancier has negative prots) because the
share s is too low. As a result, in equilibrium, there is no equity contract o¤ered to
the rms with A < A2. This means that there exist a trade-o¤ between ex-post and
ex-ante e¢ ciency. In order to prevent ex-post ine¢ ciency caused by unobservable
e¤ort, the ex-ante e¢ ciency would be sacriced, that is, small rms will not be able
to obtain the funds to invest in projects with positive present value. Convertible
debt contracts result in the same trade-o¤ as equity contracts due to moral hazard.
However, the ex-ante ine¢ ciency is a less severe problem in convertible debt con-
tracts than in equity contracts. Because in equilibrium,  < s, there exists another
threshold A1 such that for a rms with A1  A < A2, convertible debt contracts
are optimal. We show A1 < A2 in the following lemma.
Lemma 11 A1 < A2
In summary, unconstrained rms have no incentives to default strategically ex-
post even though the rm returns are not veriable. Besides, unconstrained rms
are not constrained by the incentive compatibility constraints even though there is a
moral hazard problem due to unobservable rm e¤ort. Therefore, for unconstrained
rms, standard debt, equity and convertible debt contracts are all optimal. However,
this result does not hold for the constrained rms. First of all, constrained rms
always have incentives to default strategically if the rm returns are not veriable.
The solutions to this ex-post strategical default are either to let the nancier be
an equity holder or a convertible debt holder. In other words, both equity and
convertible debt contracts can e¤ectively solve the ex-post strategical default of
the rm returns are not veriable. However, equity contracts are dominated by
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convertible debt contracts for rms with initial assets A1  A < A2 because there is
no equity contract for a rm with A1  A < A2 such that the incentive compatibility
constraint of the rm and the nanciers participation constraint are both satised
at the same time. Therefore, while equity and convertible debt contracts are both
optimal for constrained rms with A  A2, for constrained rms with A1  A < A2,
only convertible debt contracts are optimal.
This result is consistent with the stylized facts that the probability of using
convertible debt is negatively related with the rm size (Lewis, Rogalski and Se-
ward (1999)). In particular, for small rms (A1 < A < A2), only convertible debt
contracts are optimal.
Moreover, under moral hazard, we are able to explain another stylized fact
(Lewis, Rogalski and Seward (1999)) the positive relation between rmsprot-
to-asset ratio and the probability of using convertible debt in empirical evidence.
Firmsprot-to-asset ratio is dened as
prot-to-asset ratio =
p (B; eH)   B + A
A
If  increases, B increases (see Proposition 2). The prot-to-asset ratio also in-
creases,
@

p(B;eH) B+A
A

@
=
p (B; eH)
A
+
p0B (B
; eH)    1
A
@B
@
=
p (B; eH)
A
> 0 (1)
Moreover, if  increases, the threshold A1 decreases and A2 increases.
Lemma 12 @A1
@
< 0
Lemma 13 @A2
@
> 0
Note that the change of the function form of p (B; e) also a¤ects the rmsprot-
to-asset ratio. We further derive the relation between the threshold A1; A2 and the
probability function of success p (B; e) in the following lemma.
Lemma 14 Suppose p (B; ej) is a homogeneous function with degree n (n < 1). Let
F (p (B; ej)) = ep (B; ej) be a homothetic function, where F (p (B; ej)) is monotone
increasing in p (B; ej). A1 under p (B; ej) is higher than fA1 derived under ep eB; ej,
where j = H;L
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Lemma 15 Suppose p (B; ej) is a homogeneous function with degree n (n < 1). Let
F (p (B; ej)) = ep (B; ej) be a homothetic function, where F (p (B; ej)) is monotone
increasing in p (B; ej). A2 under p (B; ej) is lower than fA2 derived under ep eB; ej,
where j = H;L
If the distribution of rmsinitial assets is further assumed to be exogenous, we
derive that the probability of a rm being constrained by limited liability increases
as the rms prot-to-asset ratio increases. Using the result from Lemma 12, Lemma
13, Lemma 14, Lemma 15 and equation (1) derived above, we show that the prob-
ability of a rm using convertible debt also increases as the probability of the rm
being constrained increases.
Assumption 8 The distribution of rmsinitial assets is exogenous
Proposition 16 If the rmse¤ort is unobservable, the probability of a rm using
a convertible debt contract increases as the rms prot-to-asset ratio increases.
The result of Proposition 16 comes directly from Lemma 12, Lemma 13, Lemma
14, Lemma 15 and equation (1). Besides, we have shown that for rms with initial
assets A 2 [A1; A2], convertible debt contracts are optimal. The probability of a
rm using convertible debt can be written as
prob (A 2 [A1; A2])
First, from the results of Lemma 12, Lemma 13, and equation (1), we can con-
clude that the probability of a rm using convertible debt contracts increase as the
rmsprot-to-assets ratio increases which is due to an increase in . The reason is
that as  increases, A1 decreases and A2 increases.
Second, if the rmsprot-to-assets ratios increase is due to an increase in the
function p (B; ej) (j = H;L), from Lemma 14, Lemma 15, we conclude that A1
decreases to eA1 and A2 increases to eA2. Therefore,
prob(A 2 [ eA1; eA2]) > prob (A 2 [A1; A2])
1.4 Generalized model (2): Risk aversion
In this section, we assume Assumption 2 holds and we generalize the model by
relaxing Assumption 1. We consider risk averse rms and risk neutral nanciers.
To compare the three types of contracts under the assumption of the rms being
risk averse is more complicated. Note that the probability of success p (B; e) is
endogenous. In particular, the probability of success can be increased through a
22
higher borrowing amount B and a higher e¤ort e of rms. Under risk aversion of
rms, di¤erent types of contracts may result in di¤erent equilibrium borrowing B
as well as di¤erent e. This in turns a¤ect the probability of success p (B; e). Hence,
at this stage it is not clear to determine which type of contracts is optimal under
risk aversion of the rms without further assumptions.
In order to analyze this problem, we introduce the concept of  mixed risk
aversion, which is dened in Caballé and Pomansky (1996). They consider that
the distribution function of outcomes is endogenous and it can be inuenced by
agentsbehavior. This is the concept so called self-protection (Ehrlich and Becker
(1972)). Caballé and Pomansky (1996) show that if the rmsutility functions sat-
isfy ( 1)n+1 U (n)  0, the measurement of mixed risk aversion is monotonic with
Arrow-Pratt risk aversion. In other words, if an agent is more risk averse than the
other, we can also conclude that the agent is more mixed risk averse than the other.
Moreover, they provide a comparative study which allows us to analyze our problem
and to compare the three types of contracts.
Suppose equity contracts are o¤ered in equilibrium, the equilibrium equity con-
tracts solve the following problem
max
B;e;s
p (B; e)U (   s + A) + (1  p (B; e))U ( sA+ A)  C (e)
s.t.
p (B; e) s + (1  p (B; e)) sA B  0
0 < s  1
We denote the equilibrium equity contracts
 
BE; sEjA where BE is the equilibrium
borrowing amount and s is the equilibrium share of the rmsprots promised to
the nanciers. Since e¤ort is observable, equilibrium equity contracts depend on
the rmse¤ort choice. We further assume that it is optimal for rms to exert high
e¤ort eH even under risk aversion.
In the previous analysis, we have shown that standard debt contracts are domi-
nated by convertible debt contracts if the rms are constrained by limited liability.
As for unconstrained rms, standard debt and convertible debt contracts are both
optimal and they achieve the same equilibrium contract outcomes. Hence, In the
following, we only need to compare convertible debt contracts with equity contracts.
Suppose convertible debt contracts are o¤ered in equilibrium, they solve the
following problem:
max
B;e;
p (B; e)U (    + A)+ (1  p (B; e))U (0  (min ( Br + A;A) ; 0)) C (e)
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s.t.
p (B; e) + (1  p (B; e))min ( Br + A;A) B  0 
BCD; rCD; CDjA denotes the equilibrium convertible debt contracts.
Equity contracts make the nanciers bear more risk compared to convertible debt
contracts. In particular, the di¤erence of the rmsutility between good outcome
(the project succeeds) and bad outcome (the project fails) is smaller under equity
contracts. This in turns leads to the following result.
Lemma 17 BE < BCD
Lemma 17 demonstrates that under convertible debt contracts, risk-averse rms
will choose a higher borrowing amount BCD, which implies a higher probability of
success of the project under convertible debt. The intuition is the following: the
utility of a rm at bankruptcy is lower under convertible debt contracts than the
utility under equity contracts given the same loan size. Therefore, due to the rms
risk aversion, the rm will choose a higher equilibrium loan size under convertible
debt in order to decrease the probability of bankruptcy.
Caballé and Pomansky (2000) and Dachraoui et al. (2000) show that more
mixed risk averse individuals choose higher self-protection or are more willing to
pay more for lowering the probability of the bad outcome when this probability
is low. Although they focus on comparing agentswith di¤erent degrees of risk
aversion given the same type of contracts, their results shed some light on our result
of Proposition 18
Proposition 18 If the rms are mixed risk averse, and if p
 
BE; eH

> 1
2
(i.e, 1 
p (B; eH) < 12), equity contracts are dominated by convertible debt contracts and
thus, convertible debt contracts are optimal.
The intuition of Proposition 18 is that if the probability of failure of the project is
already low even under equity nancing, which implies that the probability of failure
is very low, this state (failure of the project) can be negligible. As a result, rms
are better o¤ if choosing convertible debt contracts, since under convertible debt
contracts, the borrowing amount BCD is higher than BE, and thus the probability
of success is also higher
 
p
 
BCD; eH

> p
 
BE; eH

. Therefore, the rmsutility if
the project succeeds is higher under convertible debt than under equity contracts.
1.5 Discussion
In the previous sections, we have generalized the model in the two directions given
non-veriability of rm returns each by each. In reality, it is plausible that both
moral hazard problem and risk aversion exist at the same time.
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From the analysis in Generalized Model (1), we have shown that for larger rms,
in particular, for A  B, the rms(IC) constraints do not bind in equilibrium.
Therefore, under the assumption of both rms and their nanciers being risk-neutral,
all three types of contracts are optimal. As for rms with assets A2  A < B, both
convertible debt and equity contracts are optimal. Standard debt contracts are
dominated because the rmsincentive of strategical default. Finally, for the small
rms with initial assets A1  A < A2, only convertible debt contracts are optimal.
In the analysis in Generalized Model (2), we have shown that under some con-
ditions, constrained rms prefer convertible debt contracts over other types of con-
tracts (Proposition 18). For unconstrained rms, both standard debt and convertible
debt contracts are optimal.
Combing both results from the analyses, if we consider an environment in which
rms are risk averse and the rmse¤ort is unobservable, we conjecture that for
unconstrained rms, both convertible debt and standard debt contracts are optimal,
and equity contracts are dominated due to risk aversion of the rms. For constrained
rms, standard debt contract are dominated because the constrained rms have
incentives to default strategically due to non-veriability rm returns. As a result,
only convertible debt contracts are optimal since convertible debt on the one hand,
induces the constrained rms to exert high e¤ort, and on the other hand, achieves
better risk sharing compared to equity contracts.
1.6 Conclusion
In this paper, we analyze optimal nancial contracts of rms with heterogeneous
initial assets. We start at building a simple model with both risk-neutral rms
and nanciers and we show that under non-veriability of rm returns, small rms
have incentives to default strategically under standard debt contracts. Equity and
convertible debt contracts can prevent the ex-post strategical default.
Further, we generalize the model and consider two additional dimensions each by
each: (1) moral hazard caused by rmsunobservable e¤ort, and (2) risk aversion of
rms or/and their nanciers. In (1), only convertible debt contracts are optimal for
small rms. Standard debt contracts and equity contracts are dominated because
of ex-post strategical default and moral hazard, respectively. In (2), rms are risk
averse and their nanciers are risk neutral. Under some condition, in particular,
if the probability of failure of the project is lower than 1
2
under equity contracts,
risk -averse rms will be better o¤ if using convertible debt contracts since under
this condition, rms prefer to choose higher borrowing amount B and thus attain
a higher probability of success of the project. This argument is true for all rms
if they all have the same level of risk aversion. Since for unconstrained rms, both
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standard debt contracts and convertible debt contracts achieve the same contract
outcomes in equilibrium, hence, both standard debt and convertible debt contracts
are optimal for unconstrained rms.
In sum, when we consider both (1) and (2) together, large rms, even under non-
veriability of rm returns, do not have incentives to default strategically. Moreover,
large rms have higher initial assets, thus they have incentives to exert high e¤ort.
However, due to risk aversion, larger rms prefer standard debt and convertible debt
contracts over equity contracts. On the other hand, small rms have incentives to
default under non-veriability of rm returns. Standard debt contracts are domi-
nated by convertible debt and equity contracts. Moreover, due to the risk aversion
of the rms, convertible debt contracts dominate equity contracts since convertible
debt not only induces the constrained rms to exert high e¤ort but only achieves
better risk sharing. Therefore, the optimality of convertible debt for small rms is
proved.
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1.7 Appendix
Proof. Lemma 1
Suppose that
 
B; s1; s2jA

is an equilibrium contract and it yields a positive
expected prot to the lender,
El
 
B; s1; s2jA

> 0
The other nancier can o¤er another contract (B0; s01; s
0
2jA) whereB0 = B, s01 = s1 "
and s02 = s2   " and the lender still have non-negative expected prot:
El
 
B; s1; s2jA

> El (B
0; s01; s
0
2jA) > 0
This contract (B0; s01; s
0
2jA) gives the rm higher expected return. Hence,
 
B; s1; s2jA

is not an equilibrium contract. By doing so, the equilibrium contract should satisfy
El = 0.
Proof. Proposition 2
The optimal contract solves the following problem
max
B;e
p (B; e) (   s1 + A) + (1  p (B; e)) ( s2 + A)
s.t.
El = p (B; e) s1 + (1  p (B; e)) s2  B  0 (PC)
   s1 + A  0 (LL1)
 s2 + A  0 (LL2)
First, we ignore the two (LL) constraints. In equilibrium, El = 0. Hence,
p (B; e) (s1   s2) + s2 = B
Plugging this into the rms objective function. For (s1; s2) satisfying (LL) and
(IC), B and e solve
max
B;e
p (B; e)    (p (B; e) (s1   s2) + s2) + A  max
B;e
p (B; e)   B + A
Under Assumption 6, in equilibrium, e = eH . Therefore, the optimal borrowing
amount
B (eH) = B
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and it satises
p0B (B
; eH) =
1

Since both rms and their nanciers are risk-neutral, the optimal repayment scheme
(s1; s

2) is indetermined and it satises the following relation
s1 =
B   (1  p (B; eH)) s2
p (B; eH)
Proof. Proposition 3(Standard debt contracts)
The equilibrium standard debt contract is the solution to the following problem
max
B;e
p (B; e) (  Br + A) + (1  p (B; e)) ( Br + A)
s.t.
p (B; e)Br + (1  p (B; e))Br  B  0 (PC)
  Br + A  0 (LL1)
 Br + A  0 (LL2)
First, we ignore LL1 and LL2 and solves the problem. Under Assumption 6, e = eH ,
and thus we derive the equilibrium B = B (eH) = B.
For unconstrained rms (A  B), both LL1 and LL2 do not bind. Equilibrium
r = 1.
For constrained rms (A < B), LL2 binds. Hence, in equilibrium,
r =
B   (1  p (B; eH))A
p (B; eH)B
> 1
All rmsexpected prots are maximized.
Proof. Proposition 4 (Equity contracts)
The equilibrium equity contract is the solution to the following problem
max
B;e
p (B; e) (   s + A) + (1  p (B; e)) ( sA+ A)
s.t
p (B; e) s + (1  p (B; e)) sA B  0 (PC)
   s + A  0 (LL1)
 sA+ A  0 (LL2)
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From Lemma 1, (PC) binds in equilibrium. Besides, due to Assumption 6, e = eH ,
and thus, equilibrium B = B where p0B (B
; eH) = 1 . And the equilibrium share
s =
B
p (B; eH)  + (1  p (B; eH))A
Moreover, in equilibrium, for unconstrained rms, s  B > sA always holds if
 > A. We prove this result by contradiction:
(a) suppose s > sA > B, in equilibrium, El = 0. Hence, equilibrium
B = B
and
s =
B
p (B; eH)  + (1  p (B; eH))A
Since s > sA > B, we have
B
p (B; eH)  + (1  p (B; eH))A >
BA
p (B; eH)  + (1  p (B; eH))A > B

This is equivalent to

p (B; eH)  + (1  p (B; eH))A >
A
p (B; eH)  + (1  p (B; eH))A > 1
From second part of inequality, we have
A
p (B; eH)  + (1  p (B; eH))A > 1
Hence,
p (B; eH) (   A) < 0
which contradicts with  > A
(b) suppose B > s > sA, the same argument as above, in equilibrium,
B = B
and hence
s =
B
p (B; eH)  + (1  p (B; eH))A > 1
which is impossible.
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Therefore, the equilibrium B and s must satisfy s > B > sA if  > A. On
the other hand, if   A, for   A  A, s < B  sA must hold in equilibrium.
Proof. Proposition 6 (Convertible debt contracts)
For unconstrained rms, the equilibrium convertible contract solves the following
problem
max
B;e
p (B; e) (  max (;Br) + A) + (1  p (B; e)) ( max (A;Br) + A)
s.t.
p (B; e)max (;Br) + (1  p (B; e))max (A;Br) B  0 (PC)
  max (;Br) + A  0 (LL1)
 max (A;Br) + A  0 (LL2)
In equilibrium, under Assumption 6, e = eH and thus, B = B. Hence, r = 1
for unconstrained rms (A  B). From the proof of Proposition 5, it is shown
that equilibrium B must satisfy   B > A if  > A. Therefore, if  > A, the
nancier does not convert if the project fails, and is indi¤erent between converting
or not converting if the project succeeds. In equilibrium, El = 0 (Lemma 1). Thus,
for unconstrained rms, equilibrium  = B


if  > A. If   A,  < B  A
must hold. Hence, the nancier does not convert if the project succeeds, and is
indi¤erent between converting and not converting if the project fails. Therefore, in
equilibrium,
 =
B
A
For constrained rms, since A < B,   B > A always holds assuming
 > A. In equilibrium, the nancier converts if the project succeeds and does
not convert if the project fails and obtain the rms total asset A. Therefore, in
equilibrium,
 =
B   (1  p (B; eH))A
p (B; eH) 
for constrained rms.
Proof. Proposition 7 (Non-veriable rm returns)
Equity and convertible debt contracts are immune to non-veriability. Hence, in
equilibrium, both contracts implement the optimal contracts derived in Proposition
2. However, standard debt contracts are not optimal for constrained rms because
constrained rms have incentives to default strategically. Therefore, under standard
debt contracts, in equilibrium, B = A, and the constrained rms expected prots
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is p (A; eH) .
We can show that
p (B; eH)   B + A > p (A; eH) 
if and only if
 >
B   A
p (B; eH)  p (A; eH)
For any constrained rm (A < B),  > B
 A
p(B;eH) p(A;eH) if (1)
B A
p(B;eH) p(A;eH) is
decreasing in A and (2) at A = 0, p (B; eH)   B > 0 holds
(2) is always true since we assume that the project is of net positive present
value. And we show (1) also holds in the following:
@ B
 A
p(B;eH) p(A;eH)
@A
=
p0 (A; eH) (B; eH   A)  (p (B; eH)  p (A; eH))
(p (B; eH)  p (A; eH))2
< 0
because
p0 (A; eH) >
p (B; eH)  p (A; eH)
B   A
is always true for any A < B since the function p (:) is strictly concave. Therefore,
(1) & (2) both hold and thus, p (B; eH)    B + A > p (A; eH)  is true for all
A < B.
In conclusion, for A < B, standard debt contracts are dominated by equity and
convertible debt contracts.
Proof. Proposition 8
The proof is the same as in Proposition 3.
Proof. Proposition 9
The proof follows Proposition 4 and (IC) bind for rms with A < A2.
Proof. Proposition 10
The proof follows Proposition 6 and (IC) bind for rms with A < A1.
Proof. Lemma 11 (two initial asset thresholds)
A1 is the threshold under convertible debt contracts such that
(p (B; eH)  p (B; eL))

   B
   A1
p (B; eH)

= cH
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Thus,
A1 = B
   p (B; eH)

   cH
p (B; eH)  p (B; eL)

And A2 is the threshold under equity nancing such that
(p (B; eH)  p (B; eL)) (   s (   A2)) = cH
where
s =
B
p (B:eH)  + (1  p (B; eH))A
Thus,
A2 =


B  

cH
p(B;eH) p(B;eL)

p (B; eH)

B +

cH
p(B;eH) p(B;eL)

(1  p (B; eH))
Let
   cH
p (B; eH)  p (B; eL) = Q
We have
A1 = B
   p (B; eH)Q
and
A2 =
 (B   p (B; eH)Q)
B +Q (1  p (B; eH)) =
A1
B +Q (1  p (B; eH))
We can show that A2 > A1 if and only if
A1
B +Q (1  p (B; eH)) > A1
That is, we have to show  > B +Q (1  p (B; eH)).
 > B + (1  p (B; eH))

   cH
p (B; eH)  p (B; eL)

= B +    cH
p (B; eH)  p (B; eL)   p (B
; eH)

   cH
p (B; eH)  p (B; eL)

=  +B   (1  p (B; eH)) cH
p (B; eH)  p (B; eL)   p (B
; eH) 
Therefore, A2 > A1 as long as the following inequality holds.
p (B; eH)   B| {z }
+
+ (1  p (B; eH)) cH
p (B; eH)  p (B; eL)| {z }
+
> 0
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Since by assumption, the project is of a positive net present value, p (B; eH)  B
is always positive. The inequality above holds and thus A2 > A1.
Proof. Lemma 12
We have
A1 = B
   p (B; eH)

   cH
p (B; eH)  p (B; eL)

and
@A1
@
=  p (B; eH) + @A1
@B
@B
@
Since under
p0 (B:eH)
p (B; eH)
<
p0 (B; eL)
p (B; eL)
we have
@A1
@B
< 0
Besides,
@B
@
=  
@2Ef
@B@
@2Ef
@B2
> 0
As a result,
@A1
@
=  p (B; eH) + @A1
@B|{z}
 
@B
@|{z}
+
< 0
Proof. Lemma 13
We have
A2 =


B  

cH
p(B;eH) p(B;eL)

p (B; eH)

B +

cH
p(B;eH) p(B;eL)

(1  p (B; eH))
and
@A2
@
=
B  

cH
p(B;eH) p(B;eL)

p (B; eH)
B +

cH
p(B;eH) p(B;eL)

(1  p (B; eH))| {z }
+
+
@A2
@B
@B
@|{z}
+
Since
@A2
@B
= (B  M)

@M
@B
pH + (B  M) + phMp0H + p0HM

> 0
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where
M =
cH
p (B; eH)  p (B; eL)
and we denote pH = p (B; eH)
Therefore, @A2
@
> 0
Proof. Lemma 14
We have
A1 = B
   p (B; eH)

   cH
p (B; eH)  p (B; eL)

And
fA1 = eB   ep eB;feH
0@   cH
p
 eB;feH  p eB; eeL
1A
Since F (p) = ep is a homothetic function, B = eB and ej = ej. Besides, F 0 > 0, we
have ep eB;feH = np (B; eH) > p (B; eH)
where  > 1 Thus,
A1  fA1
=

B   eB| {z }
=0
  

p (B; eH)  ep eB;feH| {z }
 
+
24p (B; eH) cH
p (B; eH)  p (B; eL)

 
0@ep eB;feH cH
p
 eB;feH  p eB; eeL
1A35
| {z }
=0
> 0
Therefore, A1 > fA1
Proof. Lemma 15
We have
A2 =


B  

cH
p(B;eH) p(B;eL)

p (B; eH)

B +

cH
p(B;eH) p(B;eL)

(1  p (B; eH))
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fA2 = 
 eB    cH
p( eB;feH) p(fB;feL)

p
 eB;feH
eB +  cH
p( eB;feH) p( eB;eL)

1  p
fB;feH
=
n
h


B  

cH
p(B;eH) p(B;eL)

p (B; eH)
i
n
h
B +

cH
p(B;eH) p(B;eL)
  
1
n
  p (B; eH)
i
> A2
since 
1
n
  p (B; eH)

< (1  p (B; eH))
Proof. Proposition 16
The proof follows from Lemma 12, Lemma 13, Lemma 14 and Lemma 15. Since
 and probability function p (B; ej) are the sources that a¤ect the risk-neutral rms
prot-to-asset ratios, If  increases, combine Lemma 12 and Lemma 13, we can
conclude that the probability of a rm using convertible debt contract increases if
the rmsprot-to-asset ratio increases since A1 decrease and A2 increases.
If p (B; ej) becomes ep (B; ej), from Lemma 14 and Lemma 15, A1; A2 become eA1,eA2 respectively, and
prob (A 2 [A1; A2]) < prob

A 2
hfA1;fA2i
Hence, in sum, an increase in rmsprot-to-asset ratio leads to an increase in the
probability of a rm using convertible debt.
Proof. Lemma17
If rms are risk averse, optimal contracts must solve
max
B;e;s1;s2
p (B; e)U (   s1 + A) + (1  p (B; e))U ( s2 + A)  c (e)
s.t.
p (B; e) s1 + (1  p (B; e)) s2  B = 0
   s1 + A  0
 s2 + A  0
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This problem is equivalent to
max
B;e;s2
p (B; e)U

   B   (1  p (B; e)) s2
p (B; e)
+ A

+ (1  p (B; e))U ( s2 + A)  c (e)
s.t.
   B   (1  p (B; e)) s2
p (B; e)
+ A  0
 s2 + A  0
We derive the rst order conditions for both B and s2:
[B] : p0B

U

   B   (1  p (B; e)) s2
p (B; e)
+ A

  U ( s2 + A)

(1.1)
+pU 0

   B   (1  p (B; e)) s2
p (B; e)
+ A
0@ @

B (1 p(B;e))s2
p(B;e)

@B
1A(1.2)
= 0 (1.3)
[s2] : pU
0

   B   (1  p (B; e)) s2
p (B; e)
+ A
 @ B (1 p(B;e))s2
p(B;e)

@s2
(1.4)
  (1  p)U 0 ( s2 + A) (1.5)
< 0 (1.6)
From equation 1.7, we can show that
 
@2EU
@B2
@2EU
@B@s2
> 0
consequently, @B
@s2
> 0.
Since s2 under convertible debt is higher than s2 under equity contracts, hence,
BCD > BE
Proof. Proposition18
We can show that givenBE, the rmsexpected utility is higher under convertible
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debt contracts than under equity contracts, i¤
p
 
BE; eH

U
 
   B
E    1  p  BE; eHA
p (BE; eH)
+ A
!
 p  BE; eHU    BE
p (BE; eH)  + (1  p (BE; eH))A + A

+
 
1  p  BE; eHU   BEA
p (BE; eH)  + (1  p (BE; eH))A + A

This is equivalent to
U

   B
E (1 p(BE ;eH))A
p(BE ;eH)
+ A

  U

   BE
p(BE ;eH)+(1 p(BE ;eH))A + A

U

  BEA
p(BE ;eH)+(1 p(BE ;eH))A + A
 (1.7)
<

   B
E (1 p(BE ;eH))A
p(BE ;eH)
+ A

 

   BE
p(BE ;eH)+(1 p(BE ;eH))A + A

  BEA
p(BE ;eH)+(1 p(BE ;eH))A + A
(1.8)
<
1  p  BE;eH
p (BE; eH)
(1.9)
The su¢ cient condition for the inequality above held is p
 
BE;eH

> 1
2
. Since if
p
 
BE;eH

> 1
2
,
p
 
BE; eH
8><>:

BE
p(BE ;eH)+(1 p(BE ;eH))A  
BE (1 p(BE ;eH))A
p(BE ;eH)

 

  BEA
p(BE ;eH)+(1 p(BE ;eH))A + A

9>=>;| {z }
(i)
<

  B
EA
p (BE; eH)  + (1  p (BE; eH))A

+ A
since term (i) is always negative if
p
 
BE; eH

>
1
2
Therefore, inequality 1.7 holds. Besides, from Lemma 17, we have shown that in
equilibrium, BE < BCD.
As a result, we have shown that given BE, rmsexpected utility is higher under
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convertible debt than under equity
EUCD
 
BE

> EUE
 
BE

Together with the result BE < BCD form Lemma 17, BCD maximizes the rms
expected utility under convertible debt, we derive
EUCD
 
BCD

> EUCD
 
BE

> EUE
 
BE

and the result is shown.
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Chapter 2
Non-Monotonic E¤ects of
Bankruptcy Exemptions on Small
FirmsFinance
The link between law and rmsnance are examined in many empirical works. A
simple principal-agent model is presented in this paper. Firms (agents) do not know
the quality of the projects they have chosen, however, banks can learn the quality
of the rmsprojects by costly screening. The accuracy of screening depends on
banks screening intensity exerted. Our model demonstrate that, in equilibrium,
the loan obtained by the rms, as well as the gross interest rate, are determined
through two channels: (1) Direct E¤ect: an e¤ect of bankruptcy exemptions directly
on the equilbrium debt contracts, and (2) Indirect E¤ect: an e¤ect of bankruptcy
exemption indirectly on the equilibrium debt contracts via banksscreening inten-
sity. Combining both e¤ects, our model yields a non-monotonic relation between
bankruptcy exemptions and the equilibrium loan size of the rms as well as the
equilibrium gross interest rate as shown in the data.
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2.1 Introduction
The link between law and rmsnance has been examined in a great amount of
empirical works. In particular, in a series of previous works by Berkowitz andWhite,
the impact of personal bankruptcy law on small business nance is emphasized.
Small businesses are the primary source of new jobs in the U.S. economy. From
1990 to 1995, businesses with less than 500 employees accounted for 76.5% of net
new jobs (which is the net of job creation and job destruction that both are weighted
by the rm-level employment growth rate). Moreover, small business are considered
to play an important role in the economic growth. As seen in the following table,
more than 50% of U.S. private nonfarm output is produced by small businesses.
This evidence stresses the important role of small businesses in the U.S. economy.
However, small business entrepreneurs have fewer assets and depend primarily
on debt nancing. Specically, 50.37% of small businessesexternal nance is debt
nance among all sources of nance. Commercial banks contribute 18.75% of debt
nance, which is the primary category among the nine categories of debt nance.
(see Berger and Udell (1998)). Since obtaining credits from banks is important for
small business to invest in projects, the factors that a¤ect small businessaccess to
credit in the credit market play a crucial role, one of them being the bankruptcy
law.
In the U.S., it is well known that individual and corporate bankruptcy procedures
are separated. Moreover, the U.S. personal bankruptcy law not only applies to the
consumers, but also to small businesses that are non-corporate. The reason is that,
if a rm is non-corporate, its debt is the personal liability of the owner of the rm.
The objective of the personal bankruptcy law is to o¤er a security to debtors when
they are in nancial distress (for instance, which is caused by a negative income
shock, job loss, or health problem). Borrowers can choose between ling Chapter 7
and Chapter 13.
If the borrowers choose Chapter 7, all of their unsecured debts are discharged and
they repay and give up all their assets beyond a certain level which is predetermined
by the bankruptcy exemption. Also, they do not have any obligation of repaying
the debt in the future after ling Chapter 7. In other words, their future earnings
are completely exempt. In the U.S., the bankruptcy law is a federal law and the
procedure is uniform across the country. However, each state has its own right to
set the exemption level. Most states have several types of exemptions, such as,
homestead(the borrowers/entrepreneursown resident house) exemption, equity in
vehicles and in other goods, etc. In most of the states, the homestead exemption is
the largest one.
If the borrowers choose to le Chapter 13, they have to propose to the court (as
well as the creditors) their plans for repaying part or all of their debt in the future
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by using their future earnings, but the assets they own are all exempt. Compared to
Chapter 7, Chapter 13 is less favorable to the small business owners. One reason is
that under Chapter 7, small businessesfuture earnings are all exempt, which gives
them an opportunity of "fresh start". By contrast, Chapter 13 makes it more di¢ cult
for small businesses to start a new business. Also creditors are entitled to receive
no less under Chapter 13 than under Chapter 7 (13 U.S.C. Section 1325(a)(4)) and
hence, the exemption level might have similar e¤ect on the credit market conditions
no matter which bankruptcy chapter is chosen. This means that, even if small
business entrepreneurs have chosen to le Chapter 13, the conditions of the credit
market they face are still a¤ected by the level of exemptions and the conditions are
similar as if they le Chapter 7. The statistical data shows that around 70% of all
bankruptcy lings occur under Chapter 7 (Hasan and Wang (2008)). Thus, in this
paper, we assume that borrowers le for bankruptcy under Chapter 7.
As mentioned above, the objective of the personal bankruptcy law is to provide a
security to the debtors when they are in nancial distress. Hence, higher bankruptcy
exemptions provide higher protection to the debtors. In other words, the higher the
bankruptcy exemptions are, the smaller the creditorsrights are. If the exemption
is high, the creditors are less protected when the debtors go bankrupt under since
the creditors can only obtain the debtorsassets that exceed the exemption level.
Banks are the primary creditors in the credit market. They provide credit to
fund the rmsinvestment projects. However, since the returns of an investment
project are not certain and rms might use the credit unproductively, banks may
not be able to get the repayment back. This a¤ects banks incentives to provide
(full) credit to the entrepreneurs. As LaPorta et al. (1998, p.1114) pointed out:
[C]reditors are paid because they have the right to repossess collateral. Without
these rights, investors would not be able get paid, and therefore rms would not have
the benets of raising funds from these investors.
This suggests that the higher protection of creditors right would give banks
incentives to provide more abundant and cheaper credit to the entrepreneurs. How-
ever, others have pointed out that high protection of the creditorsrights may, on
the other hand, induce creditors to make more risky loans. For instance, Posner
(1992, p. 400) notes:
Some states have generous household exemptions for insolvent debtors, others
chintzy ones. In the former states, the risk of entrepreneurship is reduced because the
cost of failure is less, but interest rates are higher because default is more likely and
the creditors position in the event of default is weaker. And note that higher interest
rates make default all the more likely. Cutting the other way, however, is the fact
that in the low-exemption states lendersrisk is less, which induces lenders to make
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more risky loans, i.e., loans likelier to end in bankruptcy. It is therefore unclear as a
theoretical proposition whether there will be more bankruptcies in the high-exemption
states or in the low-exemption ones.
Hence, another role of banks also has to be brought into attentions: the role
of screening. Banks fund a large number of investment projects in some specic
sectors, so they (may) have considerable experience dealing with similar projects
undertaken by rms in these sectors. Moreover, they (may) have more information
about the general economic trend. Hence, banks might know the quality of the
projects chosen by entrepreneurs better than entrepreneurs themselves (Manove,
Padilla and Pagano (MPP 2001), Garmaise (2001)). As a result, screening by banks
may be socially desirable. The banksincentive to screen is low when their rights of
possessing the rmsassets are better protected. In other words, if the exemption
level is low, banks may lack incentives to screen.
There have been many empirical works on the e¤ects of bankruptcy exemptions
on the credit market. Gropp et al. (1997) analyze how cross-state di¤erences in
U.S. personal bankruptcy rules a¤ect the supply and demand for household credit,
using data from the 1983 Survey of Consumer Finances. They nd that generous
state bankruptcy exemptions reduce the amount of credit available to low-asset
households (controlling for their observable characteristics) and increase the interest
rates on automobile loans. Berkowitz and White (2000) estimate that small rms
are 25% more likely to be denied credit if they are located in states with unlimited
rather than low homestead bankruptcy exemptions. This literature might lead to
the conclusion that the higher exemption causes more credit rationing. Thus, it
might be concluded that in order to improve the e¢ ciency of the credit market, a
low (or even zero) exemption is desired.
However, Berkowitz and White (2004) provide evidence that there is a non-
monotonic relation between the exemption levels and the loan size, the probability of
credit rationing and the interest rate. This evidence suggests that higher exemption
does not necessarily lead to more credit rationing. Berkowitz and White (2004)
examine the e¤ects of bankruptcy exemption levels on small rmsaccess to credit.
Their data source is the 1993 National Survey of Small Business Finance (NSSBF),
which contains a representative sample of U.S. nonnancial, nonfarm, for-prot
businesses with less than 500 employees (small businesses). Table 1 represents each
states exemption level in 1993. The personal property exemption is dened as the
sum of the states exemptions for cash and for equity in vehicles, plus the value of
the wildcard exemption (an exemption that allows a debtor to apply a certain dollar
amount to any type of property to make it entirely or partially exempt).
For states with unlimited homestead exemptions, Berkowitz and White set the
homestead exemption equal to the maximum dollar value across all states, which
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is $160,000. In order to capture the e¤ect of the unlimited homestead exemption,
they also introduce a separate dummy variable that equals one for states that have
unlimited homestead exemptions. In their paper, the exemption level is treated
as exogenous. Although each state can set their own exemption level, the data
shows that between 1983 and 1993, only a few states changed their exemption levels
each year, and the federal bankruptcy exemptions remained unchanged. Also, they
nd exemption levels do not appear to be correlated with state loan market or
demographic characteristics.
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Table 1: 1993 Bankruptcy Exemptions by States
(source: Berkowitz and White (2004))
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Table 2 and Table 3 show the logit regression result of the impact of exemptions
on the loan size as well as on the interest rate respectively. First, the homestead
exemption has a negative (positive) signicant e¤ect on the loan size (interest rates).
However, the predicted e¤ect of the homestead exemption level on the loan size
(interest rates) is non-monotonic: as the exemption level rises, the loan size (interest
rates) rst falls (rise), then rises (fall), and then falls (rise) again when the exemption
level becomes unlimited.
Berkowitz and Whites model does not explain this non-monotonic relationship
between the exemption level and the loan size. The objective of this paper is to
build a model that explains this stylized fact. In this paper, we develop a simple
one pricinpal-one agent model of competitive banking in the credit market. In
our model, investment projects are of di¤erent quality. Banks, which are the only
lenders, are able to learn the quality of a project undertaken by a rm by exercising
a costly screening. The idea is similar with MPPs paper which endogenises the
screening decision of banks. The main di¤erence between our paper and theirs is
that in their model, the project size (investment of the project) is xed. Thus,
all borrowers obtain the same loan size if they are funded. Here, on the other
hand, we allow the project size to be endogenous. This allows us to analyze the
e¤ect of the bankruptcy exemptions on the loan size. We nd that the bankruptcy
exemption has a non-monotonic a¤ect on banksoptimal screening intensity. The
banksscreening intensity in turn a¤ects the optimal loan size positively. Hence,
bankruptcy exemptions and optimal loan size displays a non-monotonic relation.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 describes the setup of
the model. In Section 3, we derive the equilibrium debt contracts under perfect
competition and analyze the e¤ect of bankruptcy exemptions on the equilibrium
contracts. Section 4 further discusses how the relation between bankruptcy exemp-
tions and the equilibrium loan size changes if the screening technology is improved.
Finally, we conclude in Section 5.
2.2 The Setup
2.2.1 Agents and environment
Consider a one-period principal-agent model in the credit market. Firms (agents)
are endowed with homestead assets which value A in the market. Each rm has an
opportunity to undertake an investment project. The assumptions of the model are:
Assumption 1 Firmsutility functions are quasi-linear. In particular, rms
utility is concave in their homestead assets. Specically, we assume the utility of
their homestead is V (A) where V (:)  0; V 0 (:) > 0 and V 00 (:) < 0.
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Following from Assumption 1, in equilibrium, rmshomestead assets are A
such that V 0 (A) = 1 and V (A) > A. As a result, rms do not have fund to
nance the investment projects since the rms will not liquidate their homestead in
order to invest in the projects. Therefore, rms have to obtain the funds from the
banks (principals).
Assumption 2 Banks are risk neutral. The banksopportunity cost of lending
per unit is assumed to be exogenous, and for simplicity, i = 1.
Assumption 3 The investment projects are of two quality: good (g) or bad
(b). A good-quality project yields an observable random return z with two possible
outcomes,
z =
(

0
if the project succeeds
if the project fails
However, a bad-quality project always yields return 0.
Also, the distribution of the realized returns of a good-quality project is endoge-
nous, and it depends on the funds B invested in the project. The probability of
success of a good-quality project is denoted as p (B), with p0 (B) > 0, p00 (B) > 0
for all B.
Assumption 4 The proportion of good-quality projects among all projects is
1
2
, which is exogenous and is known to both rms and the banks. Moreover, rms
can not distinguish the quality of the project they have chosen. However, banks
can obtain a (imperfect) report about the quality of the projects by screening. The
report obtain by banks from screening takes two outcomes: R = fRg;Rbg
The accuracy of screening depends on the screening intensity s exerted by banks,
which is private information of banks. Banksscreening intensity s is not observable
to the rms and hence not contractible. We denote Pr (Rgjg; s) as the probability
of the banks can recognize a good-quality project by exerting s, and Pr (Rgjb; s) as
the probability of the banks misbelieve a bad-quality project as a good one. As we
mentioned above, Pr (Rgjg; s) is equal to one and Pr (Rgjb; s) is decreasing in s. In
particular, the probabilities are written in the following:
Pr (Rgjg; s) = 1
Pr (Rgjb; s) =  (s) = e s
Where  (s) = 1 for s = 0, 0 (s)  0, 00 (s) > 0 for s 2 (0; s) and lim
s!s
 (s) > 0,
where s is su¢ ciently high.
The cost of screening is dened as C (s) = cf + cs, where cf is a quasi-xed cost
and cs is a variable cost.
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2.2.2 Bankruptcy law
The realized returns of the project are assumed to be observable and veriable.
When a project yields return 0, rms are not able to repay their debt and thus, they
le for bankruptcy. Under Chapter 7, once a rm les for bankruptcy, their debt
are all exempted. The bank liquidate partially the rms initial assets (A  E),
and the rm keeps the part of the asset E with utility V (E). Di¤erent levels
of bankruptcy exemptions indicate di¤erent degrees of the protection of creditors
rights. In particular, higher level of bankruptcy exemptions imply lower degrees of
the protection of creditors.
2.2.3 Discussion of Assumptions
Assumption 1: This assumption is equivalent to the fact that homestead assets
are not perfect liquid. The reason is that since the assets are not perfect liquid,
in practice, once the rms le for bankruptcy and their homesteads are liquidated,
some xed cost of liquidation, such as the commission to the trustee, must be borne.
Therefore, the money received by the creditorsfrom liquidation must be lower than
the value of the assets. Moreover, since the liquidation costs are xed, the value
of the assets is an increasing and concave function of the money received from
liquidation by the creditors.
Assumption 3: As we mentioned in the introduction, banks are usually as-
sumed to have a lot of experience in funding projects in some specic sectors. More-
over, they have better knowledge about the general economic trend (Manove, Padilla
& Pagano (2001)). Hence, banksrole of screening projects should be considered.
Under Assumption 4, banksscreening intensity is unobservable to the rms,
and hence not contractible. Therefore, if a rm obtains funds, since the rm does
not observe the banksscreening intensity, the rms believes that the probability
of the project is of good quality is still 1
2
, which is independent of banksscreening
intensity.
2.2.4 Timeline and Competitive Equilibrium
The relationship between the rms and the banks is the following:
(1) Firms randomly pick a project, and the quality of the project is unknown to
them.
(2) Given E, banks post debt contracts (B; rjA) which depend on screening inten-
sity s. Banks compete with each other by taking the debt contracts o¤ered by other
banksas given.
(3) Each rm applies for at most one contract. In other words, if the application of
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loan is rejected, rms simply do not have chances to invest.
(4) Banks choose their screening intensity and decide whether to approve the loans
given the received report about the project quality. Since screening is unobservable
to the rms, and hence, it is non-contractible.
(5) Funded project returns are realized. The rms repay their debt Br. In the case
of failure to repay their debt, the rms le for bankruptcy and banks liquidate the
rmsassets for recovering their credits.
Under perfect competition, the equilibrium debt contracts maximize rmsex-
pected utility subject to bankszero-prot condition. If banks do not screen projects
at all, all rms are funded since they cannot distinguish good-quality projects from
bad-quality projects. If banks screen, the funding decision of banks which depends
on the received report after screening is: fund if R = Rg, and reject if R = Rb.
The reason is intuitive, if after screening, banks do not distinguish funding decision
depending on the report of screening, the screening is informative but costly. Hence,
this would not happen in equilibrium.
In summary, a competitive equilibrium in the credit market is characterized by:
(a) a debt contract for given A, (B; rjA)
(b) a screening intensity s 2 [0; s] exerted by banks
(c) a funding rule: funding a project if the report is good; rejecting a project if the
report is bad.
2.3 A competitive credit market equilibrium
The funding rule states that banks only fund the projects if the received report says
that the projects are good. Besides, since the screening intensity is unobservable to
rms, the funded rmsexpected utility is
1
2
[p (B) (  Br + V (A)) + (1  p (B))V (E)] + 1
2
V (E)
The equilibrium contracts maximize the funded rmsexpected prot subject to
banksparticipation constraints. Therefore, an equilibrium contract is the solution
to the following problem:
max
B;r;s
EU =
1
2
[p (B) (  Br + V (A)) + (1  p (B))V (E)] + 1
2
V (E)
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s.t.
E =
1
2
[p (B)Br + (1  p (B)) (A   E) B] + 1
2
 (s) (A   E  B)  C (s)  0
(PCB)
EU =
1
2
[p (B) (  Br + V (A)) + (1  p (B))V (E)] + 1
2
V (E)  V (A) (PCF )
Lemma 19 E = 0
Lemma 19 shows that under perfect competition, banksparticipation constraints
bind in equilibrium. This result can be shown by contradiction. From the binding
participation constraints of banks, the equilibrium gross interest rate is
r =
2C (s) +  (s) (B   A + E)  (1  p (B)) (A   E) +B
p (B)B
Under perfect competition, the equilibrium screening intensity s should minimize
the gross interest rate for any loan size B subject to rmsparticipation constraints
given a bankruptcy exemption E.
Proposition 20 (Equilibrium screening intensity)
Equilibrium screening intensity s is
(1) s = 0 if E 2 [0; E] or E 2 E;1
(2) s > 0 if E 2  E;E, where s satises  (s) = 2c
B A+E
Proposition 20 shows that if the bankruptcy exemption is low or high, in equi-
librium, banks will not screen the rmsprojects at all. However, if the bankruptcy
exemption is at middle levels, banks will screen the rmsprojects.
Whether banks screen or not depends on whether the benets from screening
can cover the cost of screening. If the bankruptcy exemption is low, it implies that
even if the rms default and le for bankruptcy, since the exemption is low, banks
still can recover most of the credits by liquidating the rmsassets. Therefore, the
benet from screening is small. However, banks have to spend a cost C (s) = cf +cs
if they screen. If the quasi-xed cost cf is not too small, it is not worthy for the
banks to screen the rmsprojects. If the bankruptcy exemption is very high, due
to the convexity of  (s), banksscreening intensity should be very high if the banks
screen. In turns, banks have to increase a lot the gross interest rate in order to
break even. Therefore, in equilibrium, if banks screen, rms would not apply for
the loan since the cost of credits (gross interest rate) is too high. Hence, the rms
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will not undertake the investment projects. As a result, banks will not screen when
the bankruptcy exemption is very high.
Banksdecisions of screening are endogenous, consequently, the equilibrium loan
size B not only depends on the exogenous bankruptcy exemptions, but also on
the banksscreening decisions (which depends on bankruptcy exemptions). In the
following analysis, we disentangle the total e¤ect of bankruptcy exemption on the
equilibrium loan size into two e¤ects: one is Direct E¤ect and the other is Indirect
E¤ect.
Direct E¤ect is the e¤ect of bankruptcy exemption directly on the equilibrium
loan size given banks screening intensity unchanged. We demonstrate it in the
following lemma.
Lemma 21 (Direct E¤ect on B)
Given a xed s = s0,
@B
@E
js=s0 < 0 for any E
Lemma 21 shows that Direct E¤ect is always negative. In other words, an in-
crease in bankruptcy exemptions leads to a decrease in the equilibrium loan size
given a constant screening intensity of banks. The intuition of this result is that, an
increase in bankruptcy exemptions increase the rmsutility if the rms go bank-
rupt. On the other hand, if the bankruptcy exemption increases, banks would raise
the gross interest rate in order to break even. This in turn decreases the rmsutil-
ity outside of bankruptcy. Consequently, the marginal utility of loan size decreases
as the bankruptcy exemption increases. Therefore, an increase in bankruptcy ex-
emptions leads to a decrease equilibrium loan size if banksscreening intensity is
constant.
However, the equilibrium loan size also depends on the banksscreening intensity
which is determined by the bankruptcy exemptions. This is what we call Indirect
E¤ect.
Lemma 22 (Indirect E¤ect on B)
@B
@s
@s
@E
> 0 for all E
Lemma 22 shows that Indirect E¤ect is positive. In other words, an increase in
bankruptcy exemptions increases the banksscreening intensity and thus leads to
an increase in the equilibrium loan size. The intuition of the result is the following:
if the bankruptcy exemption increases, the loss of the banks becomes larger if the
rms le for bankruptcy. Hence, under perfect competition, in order to keep banks
zero-prot condition hold, banks increase the screening intensity. As a result, the
marginal utility of loan increases and thus the equilibrium loan size increases.
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From Proposition 20 and Lemma 21, we can show that if bankruptcy exemptions
are low or high, in equilibrium, an increase in bankruptcy exemptions certainly leads
to a decrease in the equilibrium loan size.
Proposition 23 If E 2 [0; E] or E 2 E;1, an increase in bankruptcy exemption
E leads to a decrease in the equilibrium loan size B
The result of Proposition 23 is straightforward. Since if the bankruptcy exemp-
tion is low (E 2 [0; E]) or is high  E 2 E;1, banks do not screen any projects
and thus s = 0. Therefore, there is no Indirect E¤ect of bankruptcy exemptions on
equilibrium loan size. The total e¤ect comes from Direct E¤ect. Following Lemma
21, the direct e¤ect of bankruptcy exemptions on the equilibrium loan size is nega-
tive.
However, if the bankruptcy exemption is in the middle level, Direct and Indirect
E¤ect coexist. Hence, total e¤ect is ambiguous since they have opposite e¤ect on
the equilibrium loan size. The result depends on the magnitudes of the two e¤ects.
In the following Proposition, we show that if the bankruptcy exemption is relatively
smaller in the middle level (i.e., E 2 [E;E1]), Direct E¤ect dominates Indirect E¤ect.
As the bankruptcy exemption continues increasing, in particular, if the bankruptcy
exemption E 2  E1; E, Indirect E¤ect dominates Direct E¤ect.
Proposition 24 If equilibrium screening intensity s > 0, there exists a threshold
E1 such that an increase in bankruptcy exemptions leads to
(1) a decrease in equilibrium loan size B if E 2 [E;E1]
(2) an increase in equilibrium loan size B if E 2  E1; E
Proposition 24 demonstrates that bankruptcy exemptions a¤ect the magnitudes
of the two e¤ects. The result is driven by the concavity of the function V (:) as well as
the convexity of  (s). When the exemption is in the middle level but still relatively
small, an increase in the bankruptcy exemption leads to a large increase in the rms
utility at bankruptcy. Besides, the rmsutility outside of bankruptcy decreases a
lot as well. As a result, the equilibrium loan size decreases since the marginal utility
of loan is small. On the other hand, when the bankruptcy exemption keeps rising,
the increase of the rmsmarginal utility at bankruptcy becomes smaller as well
as the decrease of the rmsmarginal utility outside of bankruptcy. This in turns
increase the marginal utility of loan when the bankruptcy exemption gets larger
(E 2  E1; E). Consequently, the equilibrium loan size increases.
In sum, we combine the results from Proposition 23 and 24 , and we derive the
relation between bankruptcy exemptions and the equilibrium loan size. This result
is demonstrated in the following proposition.
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Proposition 25 (Total e¤ect of bankruptcy exemptions on the equilibrium loan
size)
An increase in bankruptcy exemptions E (when E 2 [0; E1]) rst leads to a
decrease in the equilibrium loan size B. If the exemption continues increasing (E 2
E1; E

), the equilibrium loan size B increases as E increases, but nally, if the
exemption continues rising (E 2 E;1), the equilibrium loan size B decreases as
the bankruptcy exemption goes to innity..
The result of Proposition 25 is simply derived from combining the two results of
Proposition 23 and 24.
As for the e¤ect of bankruptcy on the equilibrium gross interest rate r, in the
following proposition, we show that a non-monotonic relation between bankruptcy
exemptions and the equilibrium gross interest rate also exists. In particular, the
e¤ect is symmetric but opposite to the e¤ect of bankruptcy exemptions on the
equilibrium loan size in Proposition 25.
Proposition 26 (Total e¤ect of bankruptcy exemptions on equilibrium gross inter-
est rate)
An increase in bankruptcy exemptions E (when E 2 [0; E1]) rst leads to an in-
crease in the equilibrium gross interest rate r. If the exemption continues increasing
(E 2  E1; E), the equilibrium gross interest rate r decreases as E increases, but -
nally, if the exemption continues rising (E 2 E;1), the equilibrium gross interest
rate r increases as the bankruptcy exemption goes to innity.
We have analyzed the relation between bankruptcy exemptions and the equilib-
rium debt contracts by emphasizing the banksrole of screening beside of providing
funds to the rms. Our model yields a non-monotonic relation between bankruptcy
exemptions and the equilibrium loan size as well as the equilibrium gross interest
rate, which is consistent with the data (Berkowitz and White (2004)).
In the following section, we further demonstrate that our model is not only
able to explain the stylized fact which is found by Berkowitz and White (2004),
but also o¤ers other testable applications. In particular, we predict the relation
between bankruptcy exemptions and equilibrium loan size if the screening technology
is improved.
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2.4 Discussion
2.4.1 An Improvement in Screening Technology
In this section, we discuss the e¤ect of bankruptcy exemptions on the equilibrium
loan size if the banksscreening technology has been improved. We consider three
di¤erent types of improvements: two of them are the reduction in the cost of screen-
ing and the other is the improvement in the accuracy of screening.
A decrease in the quasi-xed cost of screening
Suppose that the quasi-xed screening cost cf is reduced, it is obvious that banks
will already start screening when the bankruptcy exemption is lower compared to
the old threshold (E) we derived. Proposition 20 shows that the quasi-xed cost
determines whether banks start screening or not when the bankruptcy exemption is
low. Due to the reduction in cf , it is straightforward that the new threshold E 0 will
be smaller than the old threshold E. However, the reduction of the quasi-xed cost
cf does not a¤ect the other threshold E as well as E1, since they are independent of
cf . As a consequence, the e¤ect of bankruptcy exemptions on the equilibrium debt
contract is still non-monotonic as the analyzed above.
A decrease in the variable cost of screening
If the variable cost of per unit of screening decreases, that is, c decreases to c0
(c0 < c), the thresholds E, E and E1 we derived above all change. First of all, we
can expect that the threshold E will decrease due to the reduction of total screening
cost. Besides, E will increase because marginal cost of screening decreases and
the marginal benet of screening is unchanged for a given bankruptcy exemption.
Therefore, in equilibrium, banks continue screening even E > E. Specically, if c
reduces su¢ ciently, for E 2 E;1, it is still worthy to screen (i.e., s > 0). Thus,
equilibrium loan size will increase if the bankruptcy exemption increases for any
E 2  E;1.
In sum, an increase in the bankruptcy exemption rst leads to a decrease (in-
crease) in the equilibrium loan size (gross interest rate), and then leads to an in-
crease (decrease) in the equilibrium loan size (gross interest rate) if the bankruptcy
exemption continues increasing.
An improvement in the accuracy of screening
Now, we instead discuss about the case in which the banksscreening technology
becomes more accurate. In particular, given the same screening intensity exerted,
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the banks can distinguish the projects of good quality from the ones of bad quality
better. That is, e (s) <  (s) for any s > 0. Our conjecture is that it has the
similar e¤ect with the reduction in the per unit cost of screening. First, since now
screening is more accurate given the same screening intensity, it is equivalent to
say that for a given screening intensity, the cost of screening is lower. Hence, the
threshold E decreases. Besides, the same argument is applied to the threshold E
and E will increase. As a result, the e¤ect of an increase in bankruptcy exemptions
rst decreases (increases) the equilibrium loan size (gross interest rate), and then
increases (decreases) the equilibrium loan size (gross interest rate).
Beside of yielding the same non-monotonic relation between bankruptcy exemp-
tions and equilibrium outcomes of debt contracts as found in Berkowitz and White
(2004), our model o¤ers a testable feature for further applications. In particular, it
enables us to examine the relation between bankruptcy exemptions and equilibrium
debt contracts as the screening technology progresses over time. The model predicts
that if the screening technology is improved due to the reduction of variable cost,
or the improvement of screening accuracy, there exists a U-shaped relation between
bankruptcy exemptions and the equilibrium loan size. This result is consistent with
the empirical work by Funchal and Araujo (2006), in which they use data from
1992 to 1997 from the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Statistics on Banking
(FDIC) for small businesses and individuals loan and found a U-shaped relation
between bankruptcy exemptions and the equilibrium loan size.
2.5 Conclusion
The impact of bankruptcy exemptions on the outcomes of debt contracts in a com-
petitive credit market is analyzed in a simple principal-agent model. The banks
role of screening the projects of the rms are emphasized. We analyze the e¤ect
of homestead bankruptcy exemptions on the equilibrium loan size as well as the
equilibrium gross interest rate. The model shows that an increase in bankruptcy
exemptions at rst leads to a decrease (increase), and then an increase (decrease),
and then nally a decrease (increase) in the equilibrium loan size (equilibrium gross
interest rate). Our model yields the same results as found in the empirical work by
White and Berkowitz (2004).
An increase of bankruptcy exemptions a¤ects the equilibrium debt contracts
through two channels: (1) Direct E¤ect and (2) Indirect E¤ect. Direct E¤ect arises
from the e¤ect of an increase of bankruptcy exemptions directly decreasing the
equilibrium loan size given banks screening intensity as constant. The reason is
that if the bankruptcy exemption increases and banks keep the screening intensity
constant, in order to keep the bankszero-prot condition hold, banks would increase
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the gross interest rate. This would decrease the loan size because of the increase of
the cost of loan. Indirect E¤ect arises from the e¤ect of an increase of bankruptcy
exemptions indirectly increasing the loan size through banks endogenous choice
of their screening intensity. When the bankruptcy exemption increases, suppose a
bank keeps the screening intensity constant, the gross interest rate would increase.
However, another bank can simple choose a higher screening intensity and o¤er
another debt contract with a lower gross interest rate and thus it takes over the
market. Therefore, under perfect competition of banks, an increase in bankruptcy
exemptions leads to an increase in banksscreening intensity. This in turns decreases
the equilibrium gross interest rate and increases the equilibrium loan size. In sum,
these two e¤ects together shape the equilibrium outcomes of debt contracts. In this
paper, we show that if the bankruptcy exemption is either small or large, Direct
E¤ect dominates Indirect E¤ect. Therefore, a increase in bankruptcy exemptions
decreases (increases) the equilibrium loan size (equilibrium gross interest rate). On
the other hand, if the bankruptcy exemption is in the middle level, Indirect E¤ect
dominates Direct E¤ect. As a result, an increase in bankruptcy exemptions leads to
an increase (decrease) in the equilibrium loan size (equilibrium gross interest rate).
Moreover, our model o¤ers additional testable applications. In particular, our model
conjectures that there is a U-shaped relation between bankruptcy exemptions and
the equilibrium loan size changes if the banksscreening technology is improved due
to a decrease in the variable cost of screening or an improvement in the accuracy of
screening, which is consistent with the empirical work of Funchal and Araujo (2006).
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2.6 Appendix
Proof. Lemma 19
Banks compete with other banks and choose screening intensity by taking other
bankscontracts and other banksscreening intensity as given. Suppose that a debt
contract
 
B
0
; r
0jA given s is o¤ered in equilibrium, and the bank earns a positive
prots. However, another bank would o¤er another debt contract (B00; r00jA) given
s such that B0 = B00, but r00 < r0 but the bank still earns positive prots. Hence,
it is clear that the bank which o¤ers (B0; r0jA) would not be able to attract any
rms. By doing so, in equilibrium, given s, banks earn zero prot.
Proof. Proposition 20
Suppose that in equilibrium, s > 0, we can derive the equilibrium contracts
(B; rjA) which make the banks earn zero prot
p (B)Br + (1  p (B)) (A   E) B +  (s) (A   E  B) = 2C (s)
However, if these contracts are o¤ered in equilibrium, another bank can o¤er exactly
the same contract with s = 0 such that the bank earns positive prots for some E.
Therefore, in equilibrium, s > 0 if and only if
2C (s) < (1   (s)) (B   A + E)
which is equivalent to
2C (s)
1   (s)  B + A
 < E ((1))
where s satises
 (s) =
2c
B   A + E = e
 s ((2))
we substitute s into equation (1), and we have
2cf + 2c ln (B   A + E)  2c ln 2c B + A + 2c < E
Hence, we can nd a threshold E = E such that 2cf+2c ln (B   A + E) 2c ln 2c 
B + A + 2c = E. For E 2 [0; E], the bank can earn positive prot with s = 0.
Therefore, we show that in equilibrium, s = 0 for E 2 [0; E].
Moreover, for E 2 E;1, in the following, we show that if s > 0 in equilibrium,
EU < V (A). This implies that rms will not participate in the credit market.
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EU < V (A) if and only if
p (B)    (1 +  (s))B (2.1)
<   (1  p (B) +  (s)) (A   E) + (2  p (B)) (V (A)  V (E)) + 2C (s)(2.2)
We substitute (2) into (3), and we can nd a threshold E = E such that
p (B)   

1 +
2c
B   A + E

B
=  

1  p (B) + 2c
B   A + E
 
A   E+ (2  p (B))  V (A)  V  E+ 2cf + 2c ln  B   A + E  2c ln 2c
Moreover, we show that
p (B)  2B    (2  p (B)) (A   E)+(2  p (B)) (V (A)  V (E)) for all E 2 E;1
Proof. Lemma 21
@B
@E
js=s0 =
  @2EU
@B@E
@2EU
@B2
=
p0 (B) (1  V 0 (E))
 p00 (B) ( + V (A)  A + E   V (E)) < 0
since 1  V (E) < 0 and p00 (B) < 0
Proof. Lemma 22
We have
@B
@s
=
 @2EU
@B@s
@2EU
@B2
js=s =
  2c
B A+E
p00 (B) ( + V (A)  A + E   V (E)) > 0
and
@s
@E
=
 @2EU
@s@E
@2EU
@s2
js=s = 1
B   A + E > 0
Therefore, @B
@s
@s
@E
> 0
Proof. Proposition 23
For E 2 [0; E] and E 2 E;1, s = 0 is shown is Proposition 20. Therefore,
the equilibrium contracts solve the following problem:
max
B;r
EU =
1
2
(p (B) (  Br + V (A)) + (1  p (B)) (V (E))) + 1
2
V (E)
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s.t.
E =
1
2
(p (B)Br + (1  p (B)) (A   E) B) + 1
2
(A   E  B)  0 ((PCB))
From Lemma 1, we know that banksparticipation constraint binds in equilibrium.
Therefore, we substitute r from the banksparticipation constraint into the objective
function. By taking the rst derivative with respect to B, we have
p0 (B) ( + V (A)  A + E   V (E))  2 = 0 (2.3)
The equilibrium loan size with screening must satisfy the above equation.
By Envelope Theorem, we derive
@B
@E
=  
@2EU
@B@E
@2EU
@B2
=
p0 (B) (1  V 00 (E))
 p00 (B) ( + V (A)  A + E   V (E)) < 0
since V 0 (E) > 1 and p00 (B) < 0.
Proof. Proposition 24
Equilibrium contracts must be the solution to the following problem,
max
B;r;s
EU =
1
2
(p (B) (  Br + V (A)) + (1  p (B)) (V (E))) + 1
2
V (E)
s.t.
E =
1
2
(p (B)Br + (1  p (B)) (A   E) B) + 1
2
 (s) (A   E  B)  C (s)  0
EU =
1
2
(p (B) (  Br + V (A)) + (1  p (B)) (V (E))) + 1
2
V (E)  V (A)
Equilibrium B and s must satisfy:
F.O.C of B
p0 (B) ( + V (A)  A + E   V (E))  (1 +  (s)) = 0 ((1))
F.O.C of s
 2c  0 (s) (B   A + E) = 0 ((2))
From Lemma 21 and 22, we obtain both Direct E¤ect and Indirect E¤ect. And we
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have show that
jp0 (B) (1  V 0 (E))j| {z }
(I)
 2c
(B   A + E)2| {z }
(II)
8E < E  E1 ((3))
and
jp0 (B) (1  V 0 (E))j < 2c
(B   A + E)2 8E1 < E < E ((4))
Therefore, we have to show jp0 (B) (1  V (E))j and 2c
(B A+E)2 cross only once at
E = E1 and moreover, equation (3) and (4) are satised.
Term (I) and term (II) are both decreasing in E, and we have to show that
lim
E!E
jp0 (B) (1  V 0 (E))j > lim
E!E
2c
(B   A + E)2
and
lim
E!E
jp0 (B) (1  V 0 (E))j < lim
E!E
2c
(B   A + E)2
Moreover, we know that since when E ! E and when E ! E, equilibrium s = 0
form proposition 20. Hence, we have
lim
E!E
2c
(B   A+ E)2 =
1
B   A + E =
1
2c
and
lim
E!E
2c
(B   A+ E)2 =
1
B   A + E =
1
2c
Hence, we have to show that
2 (V 0 (E)  1) > 1
2c
and
2
 
V 0
 
E
  1 < 1
2c
And we already know that 2 (V 0 (E)  1) > 2  V 0  E  1 since V (E) is an increas-
ing and concave function of E. As long as there exists a c > 0 such that
2 (V 0 (E)  1) > 1
2c
> 2
 
V 0
 
E
  1
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We can show that there also exists a thresholdE = E1 2

E;E

such that 2 (V 0 (E1)  1) =
1
2c
, and equation (3) and (4) are satised.
Proof. Proposition 25
This result simply comes from combining the two results of Proposition 23 and
24.
Proof. Proposition 26
First, it is easy to show that if banks exert positive screening intensity s > 0
(when E 2 E;E), in equilibrium, Br is an increasing and concave function of
B. Hence, @(B
r)
@B < r
 due to the concavity of Br. Therefore, the e¤ect of
bankruptcy exemptions on the equilibrium gross interest rate is the following:
@r
@E
=
@ (Br) (B) 1
@E
= (B) 1
@ (Br)
@B| {z }
=0
@B
@E
+Br ( 1) (B) 2 @B

@E
=

1
B
@ (Br)
@B
  r

B

| {z }
 
@B
@E
Therefore, from Proposition 24, we can show that @r

@E
> 0 if E 2 [E;E1] and @r@E < 0
if E 2 E1; E.
Second, if banks do not screening s = 0 (when E 2 [0; E] and E 2 E;1),
@r
@E
=
@ (Br) (B) 1
@E
= (B) 1
@ (Br)
@B
@B
@E
+Br ( 1) (B) 2 @B

@E
=

1
B
@ (Br)
@B
  r

B

@B
@E|{z}
 
As long as @(B
r)
@B < r
, @r

@E
> 0.
@ (Br)
@B
=
2p (B)  2p0 (B)B
p (B)2
<
(B   A + E) +B   (1  p (B)) (A   E)
p (B)B
= r
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which is equivalently to
B
p (B) (2  p (B)) ( + V (A)  A + E   V (E))| {z }
(1)
>
A
B   A| {z }
(2)
((i))
Term (1) is an increasing function of B and term (2) is a decreasing function of
B. Moreover,
lim
B!0
B
p (B) (2  p (B)) ( + V (A)  A+ E   V (E)) > 0 > limB!0
A
B   A =  1
. Therefore, equation (i) holds for all B. As a result, @(B
r)
@B < r
 and thus, @r

@E
> 0
for E 2 [0; E] and E 2 E;1.
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Chapter 3
Borrowing Decisions in the
Presence of Credit Market
Imperfections and Heterogeneous
Risk Attitudes
Previous literature highlights the impact of credit market imperfections on the entre-
preneursborrowing decision. This paper shows that entrepreneursborrowing deci-
sions depend not only on the borrowing constraints, but also on the entrepreneurs
demand for consumption insurance. In our model, entrepreneursheterogeneous risk
attitudes interact with two di¤erent sources of credit market imperfections-limited
liability and moral hazard-and these imperfections result in distinct borrowing deci-
sions. Specically, when entrepreneurs are restricted by a limited liability constraint,
their borrowing and hence the invested capital increases with their initial wealth.
On the other hand, in the presence of moral hazard, entrepreneurs are constrained
by an incentive compatibility constraint, and they borrow less and hence choose
lower capital as their initial wealth increases.
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3.1 Introduction
Previous literature studies entrepreneursborrowing decisions under the assumption
that entrepreneurs are risk neutral and face borrowing constraints. Two types of
borrowing constraints are typically considered: the rst one is an incentive com-
patibility (IC) constraint arising from moral hazard, and the other is a limited
liability (LL) constraint. For example, Evans and Jovanovic (1989) consider an
environment with limited liability where entrepreneurs are o¤ered standard debt
contracts. The main factor that a¤ects entrepreneursborrowing decisions is their
initial wealth. Specically, entrepreneurs borrow more when their wealth increases.
The di¤erences between our model and Evan and Jovanovics model is that we
consider risk-averse entrepreneurs, and we do not restrict the contract space (we
consider state-contingent contracts). Also, in our model entrepreneurs make both
borrowing decisions and e¤ort choices.
Aghion and Bolton (1997) model the borrowing/lending decisions in a dynamic
environment with both moral hazard and limited liability. They assume a xed
capital investment and continuous e¤ort choices. Again, the contracts considered
are standard debt contracts. In this set-up, entrepreneurs with lower initial wealth
have to borrowmore in order to invest. Also, the fact that entrepreneurs only have to
repay their debt when their investment project is successful distorts their incentive
to exert e¤ort. They conclude that optimal e¤ort of an entrepreneur is increasing
with his initial wealth. In our static model, we take into account limited liability
and moral hazard separately (unlike Aghion and Bolton) in order to distinguish the
di¤erent impact of each type of borrowing constraint on the entrepreneursborrowing
decisions and their e¤ort choices.
The two papers above consider risk-neutral entrepreneurs so they ignore the
issue of risk management when entrepreneurs make their borrowing decisions. If
entrepreneurs are risk-averse, risk management considerations become important in
making borrowing decisions. Cressy (2000) proposed the idea of "risk rationing"
which suggests that the reason for which some entrepreneurs are excluded from the
credit market might be that the optimal contract o¤ered to them embeds more
risk than they are willing to bear. In general, when risk-averse entrepreneurs face
a risky investment, they would like to manage the risk while making investment
decisions by obtaining some insurance. The credit market provides entrepreneurs
the ability to obtain credit as well as insurance. The importance of risk management
for the borrowing decision of risk-averse entrepreneurs need not be negligible. In
the corporate nance literature, for example, MacMinn (1987) and MacMinn and
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Han (1990) show that obtaining insurance may increase the incentives to invest.12
In this paper, entrepreneurs have heterogeneous risk attitudes because of their
heterogeneous initial wealth and the Decreasing Absolute Risk Aversion (DARA)
property of their utility function. This heterogeneity generates a heterogeneous
demand for insurance (that is, for consumption smoothing between states). I also
assume that capital investment is divisible and there is no restriction on the form
of contracts banks can o¤er (contracts are state-contingent)3. I further assume a
perfectly competitive credit market (where banks are the only lenders). In this
setting, risk-sharing between entrepreneurs and banks is considered as well as their
borrowing/lending relation.
I consider three cases:
Case I: Entrepreneurse¤ort is observable and contractible, and there is no limited
liability constraint.4
Case II: Entrepreneurse¤ort is observable and contractible, but there is limited
liability constraint.
Case III: Entrepreneurs e¤ort is unobservable and there is no limited liability
constraint.
The main results are summarized as follows: in a frictionless economy in which
state-contingent contracts are feasible, banks and entrepreneurs share risk optimally.
When the entrepreneur faces di¤erent credit constraints, his borrowing decision dif-
fers. In the presence of a LL constraint, the entrepreneurs borrowing and hence his
capital investment is increasing in his initial wealth if the LL constraint is binding.
If the LL is non-binding, the entrepreneurs capital investment is a non-increasing
function of his initial wealth. That is, the relationship between an entrepreneurs
initial wealth and his capital investment is an inverted U-shaped relation. Therefore,
for constrained entrepreneurs, the result derived in Evan and Jovanovic still holds in
1MacMinn (1987) consider that bankruptcy cost and agency cost cause the value of an insured rm
to be higher than a uninsured rm. Therefore, a rm has incentive to obtain insurance. MacMinn and
Han take into account the moral hazard problem which is associated with limited liability. There exists
a conict of interest between debt holders and equity holders. This conict may cause the equity holders
to forgo the investment project which has positive present value. By obtaining insurance, they conclude
that the conict between these two parties can be eliminated and hence the investment decision would be
optimal.
2Grace and Rebello (1993) and Rebello (1995) argue that the role of insurance is to signal the quality of
rms to creditors in nancial markets. Rebello (1995) also shows how insurance contracting a¤ects rms
nancial structure (the ratio of equity and debt used for nancing an investment project) in the presence
of adverse selection.
3Meh and Quadrini (2006) show that the availability of a state-contingent contract has important
welfare consequences, and they nd that those state-contingent contracts achieve higher welfare than the
standard debt contracts.
4Case I serves as a frictionless benchmark for the following two cases in which credit market imperfec-
tions arise from two di¤erent sources.
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our environment. As for optimal e¤ort under the LL constraint, there are two cases.
When the fraction of wealth that entrepreneurs can borrow is su¢ ciently small (the
LL constraint is su¢ ciently tight), all entrepreneurs choose low e¤ort. When the
LL constraint is not so tight, however, poor and rich entrepreneurs exert low e¤ort,
but middle-income entrepreneurs exert high e¤ort. In the environment with moral
hazard, for entrepreneurs exerting high e¤ort, borrowing and capital investment de-
crease with wealth. Also, in order to induce these entrepreneurs to exert e¤ort, the
contract must entail partial (instead of full) insurance. No insurance at all need in
general not be optimal.5
The environment is described in Section 2. In Section 3, optimal contracts and
entrepreneursoptimal borrowing decisions are derived in each of the three cases.
Section 4 discusses the related literature and presents some empirical evidence sup-
porting our results. I conclude in Section 5.
3.2 The Economy
We consider a small open economy with two types of agents: borrowers (entre-
preneurs) and lenders (banks). We assume that entrepreneurs are risk-averse and
heterogenous with respect to their initial wealth A. The economy is static (there is
a single period).
Entrepreneurs have identical preferences with Decreasing Absolute Risk Aversion
(DARA) represented by the Bernoulli utility function:
U (c; z) = log c  ' (z)
where c is consumption and z is e¤ort that the entrepreneur exerts. Consumption is
simply the wealth of entrepreneurs at the end of the period. There are two possible
e¤ort levels: zH (high) and zL (low). The disutility of e¤ort is higher with high than
with low e¤ort: ' (zH) > ' (zL).
At the beginning of the period, the entrepreneur chooses a (perfectly divisible)
capital investment k 2 [0;1) and e¤ort z 2 fzL; zHg. The total capital invested
k is nanced from two sources: the entrepreneurs own wealth A, and the debt B
borrowed from banks; i.e., k = A + B. The outcome q of the project is stochastic,
taking two possible values: q = H (success) with probability p (k; z) and q = L
(failure) with probability 1   p (k; z). The probability of success has the following
5Shavell (1979) points out that moral hazard alone does not imply no insurance provision to the agent
(entrepreneur)
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functional form6:
p (k; z) =
kz1 
1 + kz1 
: (3.1)
The function in (3.1) satises the Monotone Likelihood Ratio Property (MLR
property):
prob (q = H jk; zH)
prob (q = Ljk; zH) >
prob (q = H jk; zL)
prob (q = Ljk; zL) 8k
and
prob (q = H jk; z)
prob (q = Ljk; z) >
prob
 
q = H jk0 ; z

prob (q = Ljk0 ; z) for k > k
0
and each z
This means that for a given k, higher e¤ort increases the probability of success.
Similarly, for a given z, higher capital also increases the probability of success.
Also, it is direct to verify that there exists a threshold ekFB such that:
@ (p (k; zH)  p (k; zL))
@k
> 0 8k 2
h
0;ekFBi (3.2)
and
@ (p (k; zH)  p (k; zL))
@k
 0 8k 2
hekFB;1
In the range k 2
h
0;ekFBi, the di¤erence of probability of success between exerting
high and low e¤ort is increasing in k. That is, a higher k implies a higher contribution
of high e¤ort to the probability of success. Consequently, for that region, k and z
are complements. For k > ekFB, this di¤erence of probability of success is decreasing
in k. We shall restrict attention to the rst region by choosing the parameters z, 
appropriately.
Banks o¤er state-contingent contracts to maximize expected prot (they are
risk-neutral). The credit market is perfectly competitive. We assume that banks
can o¤er variable loan sizes. Banks require no collateral, as entrepreneurs with
low wealth can choose a smaller loan size. These variable loan sizes allow banks
to o¤er di¤erent contracts to entrepreneurs with di¤erent initial wealth (which is
observable). Finally, each bank has the outside option of lending to other banks at
the exogenous riskless interest rate i.
6This is as in Paulson et al.(2006)
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3.2.1 Discussion of Assumptions
The critical assumptions in this model are the DARA utility function, and the
functional form of the production technology (3.1). The rst assumption has been
tested extensively in the empirical literature. For example, the empirical study of
Friend and Blume (1975) supports DARA. Moreover, experimental tests like Gordan
et al. (1972) and Kroll, Levy et al. (1988a) strongly support DARA. The second
assumption implies that the probability is an increasing function of capital and e¤ort
(pk  0; pz  0) and has decreasing increments and positive cross increments up to
the threshold ~kFB (pkk  0; pzz  0 and pkz  0). These assumptions are standard.
Paulson et al. (2006) derive the probability function (3.1) from the standard Cobb-
Douglas production function, and normalize it to take values in [0; 1). As mentioned,
this probability function satises MLRP which is a standard assumptions in the
principal agent literature (Holmström, 1979, Milgrom, 1981).
3.2.2 Financial Contracts
We assume that banks observe the entrepreneurs initial wealth (as well as the
realization of the projects outcome). Hence, banks can o¤er contracts which are
contingent on A and q.
In the environment with full information and no limited liability constraint (Case
I), a contract species a level of capital and e¤ort, as well as the entrepreneurs
consumption in each state (z; k; c1; c2). This case will serve as a benchmark for the
cases in which entrepreneurs face nancial constraints. We consider two kinds of
nancial constraints. The rst one is an Incentive Compatibility (IC) Constraint,
which arises from the moral hazard problem when e¤ort is unobservable. The second
is a Limited Liability (LL) Constraint.
Under moral hazard, e¤ort is unobservable, so contracts cannot be contingent
on z. Contracts specify the capital amount k, and the entrepreneurs consumption
in each state, c1 and c2. In order to induce high e¤ort, banks must o¤er contracts
satisfying the following IC constraint:
p (zH ; k) log c1 + (1  p (zH ; k)) log c2   ' (zH)
 p (zL; k) log c1 + (1  p (zL; k)) log c2   ' (zL) (3.3)
To model limited liability, I follow Evans and Jovanovic (1989), and Paulson et
al. (2006), and assume that entrepreneurs can only borrow up to a borrowing limit
that is some multiple of their initial wealth. Specically, the maximum amount that
entrepreneurs can borrow is (  1)A where  is exogenous and satises  > 1.
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Hence, the equilibrium contract has to satisfy the limited liability constraint:
k = A+B  A (3.4)
3.3 Equilibrium Contracts
3.3.1 Full Information Frictionless Benchmark
With full information (e.g. observable e¤ort), banks o¤er contracts which specify
an e¤ort level and a capital amount along with a consumption schedule, c1 and c2.
Since entrepreneurs are risk averse, the competitive equilibrium contract provides
full insurance to entrepreneurs (c1 = c2).
The entrepreneur expected utility from contract (z; k; c1; c2) is :
max
k;z2R+fzH ;zLg
p (k; z) log c1 + (1  p (k; z)) log c2   ' (z) (3.5)
where p (k; z) is given by (3.1). We focus only on the entrepreneurs who borrow.
The banks expected prot from a contract is:
p(k; z)R1 (c1) + (1  p(k; z))R2 (c2)  (k   A) i
where i is the riskless interest rate, R1(c1) = H   c1 and R2(c2) = L   c2. That
is, R1, R2 are the repayments when the project is successful and when it fails,
respectively.
Competition among banks implies that for a given A, the equilibrium contract
maximizes the entrepreneurs expected utility subject to the banks zero prot con-
straint (i.e., it is optimal)
max
k;z;c1;c2
fp (k; z) log c1 + (1  p (k; z)) log c2   ' (z)g
s.t.
p (k; z) (H   c1) + (1  p (k; z)) (L   c2)  (k   A) i  0: (3.6)
First of all, it is direct to show that banks make zero prots in equilibrium, and
that the equilibrium contract entails full insurance; i.e.,
cFB1 = c
FB
2 = p (k; z) H + (1  p (k; z)) L   (k   A) i:
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Substituting c1 and c2 in (3.5), the previous optimization problem reduces to:
max
k;z2R+fzH ;zLg
flog [L   (k   A) i+ p (k; z) (H   L)]  ' (z)g
The rst-order condition for capital k satises:
@p (k; zj)
@k
(H   L) = i; for j = L;H:
This condition gives the optimal capital amount as a function of e¤ort, kFBH = k (zH)
and kFBL = k (zL). We now study which level of e¤ort is optimal for a given A.
Lemma 27 Under MLR property, condition 3.2 and kFB (zH) < ekFB, kFB (zH) >
kFB (zL)
Proof. See Appendix.
Lemma 27 provides conditions for a monotonic relation between e¤ort and capital
investment.
The following proposition shows entrepreneursoptimal choices of capital and
e¤ort with respect to their initial wealth A.
Proposition 28 (First-Best e¤ort, capital and borrowing)
Suppose the conditions in Lemma 27 hold. Then there exists a threshold AFB
such that
(a) entrepreneurs with 0  A  AFB choose high e¤ort , capital kFBH and bor-
rowing BFB (A) = kFBH   A
(b) entrepreneurs with A > AFB choose low e¤ort, capital kFBL (< k
FB
H ) and
borrowing BFB (A) = kFBL   A
Proof. See Appendix.
Proposition 28 says that entrepreneurs with low wealth have higher capital invest-
ment and e¤ort than entrepreneurs with high wealth. Poor entrepreneurs (A < AFB)
exert high e¤ort because with DARA the marginal benet from exerting high ef-
fort is higher when wealth is lower (it decreases with wealth). Note that, with full
information, entrepreneursheterogeneous wealth has no inuence on their capital
decision. The only determinant of the capital decision is the entrepreneurschoice of
e¤ort (see gure 3-1 and gure 3-2). Entrepreneurs with initial wealth A 2 [0; AFB]
exert high e¤ort and hence choose a higher capital investment kFBH . On the other
hand, entrepreneurs with initial wealth A > AFB exert low e¤ort and choose a lower
capital investment kFBL .
The following corollary provides conditions that ensure that AFB > 0, so some
of the entrepreneurs with lower wealth choose high e¤ort.
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Corollary 29 Suppose
' (zH)  ' (zL) < log pHH + (1  pH) L   kHi
pLH + (1  pL) L   kLi ;
where we denote pH = p (kH ; zH) and pL = p (kL; zL). Then AFB > 0.
Proof. See Appendix.
Corollary 29 says that the threshold AFB is positive if exerting high e¤ort is not
too costly relative to exerting low e¤ort, and if the ratio pH
pL
or H
L
is large enough.
(Otherwise, AFB is negative and every entrepreneur exerts low e¤ort regardless of
his initial wealth).
Figure 3-1: Optimal e¤ort under full information
Figure 3-2: Optimal capital under full information
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Figure 3-3: Optimal borrowing under full information
3.3.2 Limited Liability
After studying the full information frictionless environment, now we study an en-
vironment with limited liability. A competitive equilibrium is as in the previous
section except that now (in addition to the zero-prot constraint) contracts must
satisfy an extra limited liability (LL) constraint:
k  A with  > 1
Again, the zero prot constraint is binding and, since e¤ort is observable and entre-
preneurs are risk-averse, the equilibrium contract provides full insurance; i.e.,
cLL1 = c
LL
2 = p (k; z) H + (1  p (k; z)) L   (k   A) i
The rst thing to note is that for entrepreneurs whose rst-best level of capi-
tal kFB (zj) satises kFB (zj) < A, j = H;L, and the limited liability constraint
does not bind. The optimal contract in this case is the same as in the full infor-
mation benchmark. However, for entrepreneurs with kFB (zj) > A, the limited
liability constraint does bind, and in this case, kLL (zj) = A and the borrowing is
BLL (zj; A) = (  1)A
Proposition 30 (optimal capital under limited liability)
Entrepreneurs are constrained by LL if their initial wealth satises: A < Ak;LL =
kFB(zj)

, and are unconstrained otherwise.
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Note that it is richer entrepreneurs who are unconstrained (because LL is more
likely to be slack when A is higher and k is lower). Assuming Ak;LL < AFB, the
threshold for e¤ort and capital investment is the same as in the full information
case AFB. As shown in Figure 3-4, the optimal capital is a function of A when
entrepreneurs are constrained by limited liability. For lower wealth levels the LL
constraint binds, so the optimal capital is A, and increases with A up to some level
Ak;LL For A > Ak;LL; the LL constraint does not bind and so the optimal capital is
the rst best one.
Figure 3-4: Optimal capital under limited liability a)
Figure 3-5: Optimal borrowing under limited liability a)
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Figure 3-6: Optimal capital under limited liability b)
Figure 3-7: Optimal borrowing under limited liability b)
The following lemma characterizes the threshold bAz;LL for the optimal e¤ort level
of the constrained entrepreneurs.
Lemma 31 There exists a threshold Az;LL that satises
log
L   (Az;LL   Az;LL) i+ p (zH ; Az;LL) (H   L)
L   (Az;LL   Az;LL) i+ p (zL; Az;LL) (H   L) = ' (zH)  ' (zL)
such that
(a) Az;LL  Ak;LL, if AFB > Ak;LL,
(b) Az;LL > Ak;LL, otherwise,
Proof. See Appendix.
75
In the following proposition, we derive entrepreneursoptimal choices of e¤ort
under limited liability.
Proposition 32 (optimal e¤ort under limited liability)
If AFB  Ak;LL,
(a1) constrained entrepreneurs with wealth A 2 [0; Az;LL] exert low e¤ort.
(a2) constrained entrepreneurs with wealth A 2 (Az;LL; Ak;LL) exert high e¤ort.
If AFB < Ak;LL,
(b) All entrepreneurs exert low e¤ort whether they are constrained or not.
Proof. See Appendix.
Figure 3-8: Optimal e¤ort under limited liability a)
Figure 3-9: Optimal e¤ort under limited liability b)
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Figure 3-8 shows that in the case with eAFB  Ak;LL, constrained entrepreneurs
exert low e¤ort when they are very poor (A < A^z;LL < Ak;LL) but exert high
e¤ort when their initial wealth lies in some middle range. Richer individual are
unconstrained entrepreneurs (A  Ak;LL) and they always exert low e¤ort.
All entrepreneurs are still fully insured. The richer unconstrained entrepreneurs
level of capital is optimal. However, for poor entrepreneurs (A 2 0; Ak;LL), capital
is ine¢ ciently low (they obtain less capital than they desire). The binding LL
constraint reduces the benet of exerting high e¤ort. In particular, for very poor
entrepreneurs (A 2
h
0; bAz;LLi, bAz;LL < Ak;LL) this reduction is large enough to
make them to choose low (instead of high) e¤ort. This in turn implies that the
capital investment of these individuals is ine¢ ciently low. Individuals with A 2
[Az;LL; Ak;LL] continue to choose zH and the capital kFB (zH) even if they have less
incentives to do so now compared to the rst best e¤ort.
In summary, if AFB  Ak;LL (the LL constraint is less tight), some of the entre-
preneurs that exerted high e¤ort in the full-information case now exert low e¤ort
because the binding limited liability constraint reduces the incentives to provide
high e¤ort. On the other hand, if AFB < Ak;LL (the LL constraint is tighter), all
entrepreneurs choose to exert low e¤ort zL since they do not have desired capital
amount (kFB (zj) > A), and hence, the benets of exerting high e¤ort is less than
the costs of doing so.
3.3.3 Moral Hazard
Suppose now that e¤ort is unobservable. We shall restrict to levels of wealth A <
AFB for which the optimal level of e¤ort is high. For A  AFB, the optimal level of
e¤ort is low and the IC constraint does not bind, so the contract coincides with the
rst-best contract. Contracts specify a consumption schedule (c1; c2), and a loan
size B (B = k   A). The di¤erence with the frictionless benchmar is that contracts
must now satisfy the incentive compatibility (IC) constraint (3.3).
For A < AFB, the equilibrium contract with moral hazard
 
kMH ; bc1; bc2 maximizes
the entrepreneurs expected utility subject to the bankszero prot constraint and
the IC constraint:
max
k;c1;c2
p (k; zH) log c1 + (1  p (k; zH)) log c2   ' (zH)
s.t.
p (k; zH) (H   c1) + (1  p (k; zH)) (L   c2)  (k   A) i  0
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and
p (k; zH) log c1 + (1  p (k; zH)) log c2   ' (zH)
 p (k; zL) log c1 + (1  p (k; zL)) log c2   ' (zL)
The following proposition characterizes the equilibrium contract with moral haz-
ard for wealth A 2 [0; AFB].7
Proposition 33 For A < AFB, both the zero-prot and the IC constraint bind.
Proof. See Appendix
Proposition 34 (optimal consumption, capital, borrowing and e¤ort under moral
hazard)
For every A 2 [0; AFB]
(a) The optimal consumption schedule
 bc1MH ; bc2MH entails partial insurance
since bc1MHbc2MH > 1
(b) Optimal capital kMH and borrowing BMH are both decreasing in A. Also,
wealthier entrepreneurs bear higher risk: bc1MHbc2MH increases with A.
Proof. See Appendix.
For A < AFB, entrepreneurs become less risk averse when wealth increases,
and so their demand for insurance decreases. Hence, the richer the entrepreneurs,
the harder it is to provide them with incentives to exert e¤ort by making them
bear part of the risk (since they care less about risk). This is why as A increases,
the entrepreneur bears more investment risk himself. In other words, banks use a
higher-power incentive scheme for the richer entrepreneurs, which means that the
consumption schedule depends more on the realized project outcomes. Moreover,
the optimal capital investment under moral hazard kMH and hence the borrowing
BMH
 
= kMH   A are decreasing when the entrepreneurs initial wealth increases.
In summary, when e¤ort is unobservable, the full-insurance contract is not in-
centive compatible. In this case, a partial insurance contract is o¤ered. The degree
of the partial insurance is determined by the entrepreneurs wealth, which a¤ects
his risk attitude and hence his demand for the consumption insurance. The higher
the entrepreneurs wealth A, the lower the amount of insurance that the contract
must entail to induce the entrepreneur to exert high e¤ort.
7The assumption that utility is separable in e¤ort is key to show that the IC constraint binds. This
need not be the case with non-separable utility (see Bennardo and Chiappori 2002).
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3.4 Related Literature
As mentioned in the introduction, there is a literature that studies the impact
of credit market imperfections on entrepreneursborrowing decisions. Evans and
Jovanovic (1989) construct a static model of risk neutral entrepreneurs with het-
erogenous initial wealth. Entrepreneurs are o¤ered standard debt contracts. They
conclude that under limited liability constraint, entrepreneurs borrow more when
their initial wealth increases. In this paper, we consider that entrepreneurs are risk
averse. State-contingent contracts instead of standard debt contracts are o¤ered,
and this allows entrepreneurs to obtain optimal insurance on consumption in each
state. Moreover, we consider not only the impacts of limited liability constraint
on entrepreneursdecisions of borrowing but also entrepreneurse¤ort choices. Our
results show that for constrained entrepreneurs, the borrowing amount is increasing
as wealth increases, which is the same as shown in Evan and Jovanovic. Moreover,
we nd that if the LL constraint is less tight ( is larger), there is an inverted U-
shape relationship between entrepreneurscapital investment and their wealth as
well as the relationship between entrepreneurse¤ort choices and wealth. On the
other hand, if the LL constraint is su¢ ciently tight ( su¢ ciently small), all en-
trepreneurs exert low e¤ort and capital investment is a non-decreasing function of
entrepreneursinitial wealth.
Aghion and Bolton (1997) consider risk neutral entrepreneurs in a dynamic envi-
ronment with moral hazard and a limited liability constraint. They consider again
standard debt contracts, and assume a xed capital investment and continuous e¤ort
choices. In their environment, the poor entrepreneurs need to borrow more in order
to invest and it is harder to induce these entrepreneurs to exert e¤ort since limited
liability does not allow banks to punish them when their performance is poor. Their
main result is that entrepreneurse¤ort is increasing as wealth increases. In this
paper, we consider moral hazard and limited liability separately in order to distin-
guish the impacts of two di¤erent borrowing constraints on risk averse entrepre-
neursborrowing decision and their e¤ort choices. Also, we endogeneize the choice
of capital investment (which is assumed divisible). Finally, to take into account
the entrepreneursdemand for insurance, we introduce risk aversion and consider
state-contingent contracts. Our results show that in the environment with moral
hazard alone, the capital investment is decreasing in wealth. As for optimal e¤ort
choices, IC constraint is binding for poorer entrepreneurs but not binding for richer
entrepreneurs.
In the literature of corporate nance, rm/entrepreneursborrowing decisions
are an important issue. Entrepreneursborrowing decisions and hence their capi-
tal structure can a¤ect rms/entrepreneursproduction decisions. Modigliani and
Miller (1958) show that the capital structure is irrelevant for rms production de-
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cision when the capital market is perfect. However, this result is challenged when
the capital/credit market imperfections are considered. When the capital/credit
market is imperfect, the capital structure does matter. Beside of the credit market
imperfections, the demand of entrepreneursinsurance is also a source that a¤ects
entrepreneursborrowing decisions8. When the credit/capital market is imperfect,
equilibrium contracts provide only partial insurance. Due to this partial consump-
tion insurance, the entrepreneurs borrowing and investment decision is distorted.
3.5 Conclusions
This paper shows that when entrepreneurs di¤er in their wealth and their prefer-
ences are characterized by DARA, their borrowing decisions and capital investment
decisions depend not only on the borrowing constraints, but also on their demand
for consumption insurance.
First, we study an environment with a limited liability constraint and nd that
relatively poor entrepreneurs are constrained from borrowing and their optimal cap-
ital increases with their initial wealth. Specically, if the LL constraint is su¢ ciently
slack ( is su¢ ciently large), there is an inverted U-shape relationship between en-
trepreneurscapital investment/e¤ort and their wealth. In this case, since e¤ort is
observable, banks can o¤er contracts which are contingent on e¤ort and still provide
risk-averse entrepreneurs full insurance through lending. Consequently, entrepre-
neursheterogeneous risk attitudes do not play an important role in their borrowing
decisions.
We also study an environment with moral hazard. There, poor entrepreneurs are
constrained from borrowing (in other words, the optimal capital is lower than the
rst-best capital amount). Besides, the optimal capital and borrowing are decreasing
when the initial wealth increases. Moreover, because e¤ort is unobservable, banks
o¤er contracts which provide only partial insurance to the entrepreneurs (since the
full insurance is not feasible anymore). The degree partial insurance entailed by
the contract in turn depends on the entrepreneurs wealth. Entrepreneur with lower
wealth are more risk averse, so it is easier to induce them to exert high e¤ort. For
these entrepreneurs, both the degree of insurance and the amount of capital are
higher. However, for the richer entrepreneur (who cares less about insurance), the
bank delegates more responsibility of the outcomes of the project to the entrepreneur
by providing them less insurance and lower capital. That is, with moral hazard,
8Gobert (2001) considers the long term nancial relationship between rms and nanciers in an en-
vironment with full information. And he stresses that nanciers not only can provide credit but also
insurance to the rms. Leland (1998) focuses on the importance of both rmscapital structure and their
risk management strategy.
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entrepreneursheterogeneus risk attitudes matter in their borrowing decision.
In summary, entrepreneursneeds for insurance in this paper is induced by their
risk aversion, which inuence their borrowing decisions, the optimal capital choices
and e¤ort choices. The other factors which also a¤ect entrepreneurs borrowing
decisions are the borrowing constraints arisen from credit market imperfections.
In the case of limited liability, these two factors are independent. The optimal
borrowing decision depends only on the entrepreneurs initial wealth (but it does
not depend on the level of risk aversion). However, in the case of moral hazard,
these two factors are not independent anymore and they interact with each other.
Higher wealth means lower risk aversion, and higher risk aversion makes it harder
to provide incentives to exert e¤ort. Consequently, the optimal borrowing decision
di¤ers because of entrepreneursheterogeneous risk attitudes.
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3.6 Appendix
Proof. (Lemma 27)
a) By setting @p
@k
(zH ; k) =
@p
@k
(zL; k), we have
k 1z1 H
(1+kz1 H )
2 =
k 1z1 L
(1+kz1 L )
2 : Hence,
k =

z
1
2
H
(zHzL)
 1 

and
@p
@k
(zH ; k) = 
 
z
1
2
H
(zHzL)
! (1 )2

z1 H
0@1 + z 12H
(zHzL)
!1 
z1 H
1A 2
This function is increasing in zL:
@
0@ z 12H
(zHzL)
 (1 )2

z1 H
 
1 +

z
1
2
H
(zHzL)
1 
z1 H
! 21A
@zL
> 0
Therefore, I can bound it by substituting zL by zH , and the following condition is
derived for any zL < zH :

z
(1 )(3 )=2
H
1 + 2z
  1
2
(1 )
H + z
 (1 )
H
 < 

z
1
2
H
(zHzL)
 (1 )2

z1 H 
1 +

z
1
2
H
(zHzL)
1 
z1 H
!2 < iH   L
b) As in part a), I derive ek =  z 12H
(zHzL)
 1 

which satises @p
@k

zH ;ek = @p@k zL;ek.
And for k  ek, @p
@k
(zH ; k)  @p@k (zL; k). On the other hand, for k > ek, @p@k (zH ; k) <
@p
@k
(zL; k).
Proof. (Proposition 28)
a) the entrepreneur chooses optimal e¤ort by comparing the expected utility of
exerting high e¤ort with that of exerting low e¤ort. First of all, the expected utility
of exerting high e¤ort is
log (pHH + (1  pH) L   (k (zH)  A) i)  ' (zH)
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and that of exerting low e¤ort is
log (pLH + (1  pL) L   (k (zL)  A) i)  ' (zL)
Therefore, if
log (pHH + (1  pH) L   (k (zH)  A) i)  ' (zH)
 log (pLH + (1  pL) L   (k (zL)  A) i)  ' (zL)
the entrepreneur chooses to exert high e¤ort and low e¤ort otherwise. From above,
we derive a threshold eA by setting
log (pHH + (1  pH) L   (k (zH)  A) i)  ' (zH)
= log (pLH + (1  pL) L   (k (zL)  A) i)  ' (zL)
Thus, eA = L (1 4')  i [kH  4'kL] + (H   L) [pH   pL4']4'  1
Entrepreneurs with 0  A  AFB, they exert high e¤ort. On the other hand, for
those with A > AFB, they exert low e¤ort.
b) as for optimal capital, there is an one-to-one relation between e¤ort and
capital. Once the entrepreneur chooses his optimal e¤ort, he simultaneously decides
optimal capital which is a function of his e¤ort. Therefore, entrepreneurs with
0  A  AFB choose optimal capital k (zH) and those with A > AFB choose k (zL).
By choosing parameters properly to make Lemma 1a) hold, we have k (zH) > k (zL) :
Proof. (Corollary 29)
From the previous proposition, we have
AFB =
L (1 4')  i [kH  4'kL] + (H   L) [pH   pL4']
4'  1
where 4' = e'(zH) '(zL). In order to have AFB > 0, we need
L (1 4')  i [kH  4'kL] + (H   L) [pH   pL4'] > 0
which is equivalent to
' (zH)  ' (zL) < log pHH + (1  pH) L   kHi
pLH + (1  pL) L   kLi
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Proof. (Lemma 31)
a) as AFB is the threshold deciding optimal e¤ort and Ak;LL is the threshold such
that the entrepreneurs wealth exactly equals to k

(= Ak;LL). Thus, if Ak;LL  AFB,
the following holds:
log
L   (Ak;LL   Ak;LL) i+ p (zH ; Ak;LL) (H   L)
L   (Ak;LL   Ak;LL) i+ p (zL; Ak;LL) (H   L)  ' (zH)  ' (zL)
Moreover, log L (A A)i+p(zH ;A)(H L)
L (A A)i+p(zL;A)(H L) is an increasing function of A. Therefore,
Az;LL must not be bigger than Ak;LL (Az;LL  Ak;LL), where Az;LL satises
log
L   (Az;LL   Az;LL) i+ p (zH ; Az;LL) (H   L)
L   (Az;LL   Az;LL) i+ p (zL; Az;LL) (H   L) = ' (zH)  ' (zL)
b) same way to prove it as in part a)
Proof. (Proposition 32)
(a1), (a2) for the case with AFB  Ak;LL, since from Lemma 2, we have Az;LL 
Ak;LL such that it satises
log
L   (Az;LL   Az;LL) i+ p (zH ; Az;LL) (H   L)
L   (Az;LL   Az;LL) i+ p (zL; Az;LL) (H   L) = ' (zH)  ' (zL)
and log L (A A)i+p(zH ;A)(H L)
L (A A)i+p(zL;A)(H L) is an increasing function of A, we derive
log
L   (A  A) i+ p (zH ; A) (H   L)
L   (A  A) i+ p (zL; A) (H   L)  ' (zH)  ' (zL) 8A 2 [0; Az;LL]
and
log
L   (A  A) i+ p (zH ; A) (H   L)
L   (A  A) i+ p (zL; A) (H   L) > ' (zH)  ' (zL) 8A 2 (Az;LL; Ak;LL]
Therefore, we have the results.
b) if AFB < Ak;LL, constrained entrepreneurs with A < Ak;LL have
log
L   (A  A) i+ p (zH ; A) (H   L)
L   (A  A) i+ p (zL; A) (H   L) < ' (zH)  ' (zL)
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And unconstrained entrepreneurs with A  Ak;LL (> AFB) have
log
L  
 
kFBH   A

i+ p
 
zH ; k
FB
H

(H   L)
L   (kFBL   A) i+ p (zL; kFBL ) (H   L)
< ' (zH)  ' (zL)
Therefore, they all choose to exert low e¤ort.
Proof. (Proposition 33)
a) suppose IC constraint binds but the banks zero-prot constraint does not.
The equlibrium contract is (c1; c2; k) : First, we can rewrite the binding IC constraint
as follows:
c1
c2
= e
'(zH) '(zL)
p(k;zH) p(k;zL) = g > 1
Rearrange the equation above and substitute c1 = gc2 into the banks prot function.
And because the banks zero-prot constraint does not bind, we have
p (k; zH) (H   gc2) + (1  p (k; zH)) (L   c2)  (k   A) i > 0
which is equivalent to
p (k; zH) H + (1  p (k; zH)) L   c2 (1 + (g   1) p (k; zH)) > (k   A) i
therefore, another bank can o¤er a new contract
 
c
00
1 ; c
00
2 ; k
00
such that c
00
2 = c2 + ",
c
0
1 = c
0
2g = (c2 + ") g and k
0
= k. By doing this, the bank still earn positive expected
prot and it can take over the whole market and also the entrepreneur is better o¤.
Thus, each bank keeps undercutting the prot by doing so. At the end, zero-prot
condition is satised in the equilibrium.
b) suppose the banks zero-prot constraint binds but IC does not. The equilib-
rium contract is (c1; c2; k). The zero-prot condition is equivalent to
c1 =
p (k; zH) H + (1  p (k; zH)) L   (k   A) i
p (k; zH)
  1  p (k; zH)
p (k; zH)
c2
Since IC does not bind: c1
c2
> e
'(zH) '(zL)
p(k;zH) p(k;zL) = g > 1; by substituting zero-prot
condition to IC constraint and rearrange it:
c2 <
p(k;zH)H+(1 p(k;zH))L (k A)i
p(k;zH)
g + 1 p(k;zH)
p(k;zH)
= Q
Hence, banks can o¤er another contract c
0
2 = c2 + " < Q and c
0
1 = c1   1 p(k;zH)p(k;zH) "
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and k
0
= k so that the entrepreneur has higher expected utility:
p (zH ; k) log c
0
1 + (1  p (zH ; k)) log c
0
2   ' (zH)
> p (zH ; k) log c1 + (1  p (zH ; k)) log c2   ' (zH)
The inequality above holds i¤
log c1
c
0
1
log
c
0
2
c2
<
1  p (k; zH)
p (k; zH)
Moreover, since we know that k < kFB 2 0; k such that kz1 H < 1 for any
k 2 0; k. Thus, p (zH ; k) < 12 and 1 p(k;zH)p(k;zH) = N > 1: Then we have log c1c01 <
N log
c
0
2
c2
! c1
c
0
1
<

c
0
2
c2
N
! c1
c1 N" <

c2+"
c2
N
c) Suppose that IC constraint and zero-prot condition both do not bind
From a), we know that banks would keep undercutting the prot till there is no
positive prot. And hence the result follows by b), IC also has to bind.
Proof. (Proposition 34)
a) since IC has to bind at the equilibrium
(p (zH ; k)  p (zL; k)) (log bc1   log bc2) = ' (zH)  ' (zL)
we have log bc1bc2 = '(zH) '(zL)p(zH ;k) p(zL;k) > 0. Hence, bc1bc2 > 1:
b) in the equilibrium, the shadow price of bankszero-prot condition  (> 0)
and IC constraint  (> 0) are follows:
1

= pHH + (1  pH) L   (k   A) i
 =
(g   1) pH (1  pH)
(pH   pL) (1 + (g   1) pH)
We check the relation between entrepreneurswealth and these two shadow prices
of the constraints:
@
@A
=
(pH   pL) (1 + (g   1) pH)

@g
@k
pH (1  pH) + @pH@k (g   1) (1  2pH)

(pH   pL)2 (1 + (g   1) pH)2
+
(g   1) pH (1  pH)
 
@pH
@k
  @pL
@k

(1 + (g   1) pH) + (pH   pL)
 
@g
@k
pH + (g   1) @pH@k

(pH   pL)2 (1 + (g   1) pH)2
We have: (i) if pH  12
  kz1 H  1, then @@A > 0, and (ii) if pH > 12   kz1 H > 1,
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@
@A
< 0. Moreover, at equilibrium we have c1
c2
= (1 pH)(pH pL)+pH(1 pH)
pH(pH pL)+pH(1 pH) . Therefore,
@ c1
c2
@
> 0
We combine the conditions we derived above and also (IC) constraint,
@
c1
c2
@A
> 0 and
hence @k
@A
< 0
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